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GETTING PAST POSSESSION:
SUBSURFACE PROPERTY DISPUTES AS NUISANCES
Joseph A. Schremmer*
Abstract: Property rights in the subsurface of land are adapting to accommodate modern
activities like massive hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Property rights will need to continue
adapting if they are going to accommodate other developing activities like large-scale carbon
capture and storage (CCS). Courts and commentators rarely approach the nature of subsurface
property directly. They tend instead to discuss appropriate standards for tort liability when
disputes arise—for example when artificial fissures from a frac treatment extend into and drain
oil or gas from a neighbor’s land. The case law and literature generally approach unauthorized
subterranean invasions as trespasses. Because the tort of trespass is designed to protect
possession, its application indicates a view of subsurface property as possessory (or
corporeal) in nature.
Despite calling subsurface invasions “trespasses,” courts rarely impose liability for, or
enjoin, invasions themselves. They instead find liability only for interferences with existing or
foreseeable uses of the affected land. Leading scholars likewise advocate for a standard of
subsurface “trespass” that would privilege encroachments that are societally valuable, and
award compensation only for resulting harm to existing uses of the property. The cases and
literature thus nominally apply trespass but modify the tort from a property rule into a liability
rule resembling the tort of nuisance.
This Article is the first to examine unauthorized subsurface encroachments as nuisances,
rather than trespasses, and to assert that such encroachments do not implicate possession.
Drawing on geology, doctrine, and property theory, this Article interrogates the assumption
that subsurface property is possessory. It analyzes prominent subsurface “trespass” cases
involving waste disposal, enhanced oil recovery, fracking, natural gas storage, slant-hole wells,
tunneling, and horizontal drilling to demonstrate that these disputes are already being resolved
under nuisance-like principles. It argues that express application of nuisance law is doctrinally
correct and would improve courts’ reasoning, harmonize disparate results, and more efficiently
allocate costs of subsurface activities. The Article then discusses how viewing subsurface
invasions as nuisances would remove legal barriers to implementation of new and emerging
climate change mitigating technologies that utilize subsurface pore space, such as CCS.
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INTRODUCTION
Oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons deposited within geologic reservoirs
have long been scarce and valuable, and ownership rights in them are
generally well defined.1 The subsurface rock structure and interstitial pore
1. Ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals is defined by the rule of capture. Subject to certain
common law and statutory exceptions, under the rule of capture ownership of oil and gas vests in the
owner of the producing well regardless of where the oil or gas migrated from. See JOHN S. LOWE ET
AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON OIL & GAS LAW 56–116 (7th ed. 2018) (discussing ownership of
minerals and the rule of capture); PATRICK H. MARTIN ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS: THE LAW OF
OIL & GAS 17–75 (10th ed. 2016) (describing mineral ownership theories and the rule of capture);
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space in which hydrocarbons and connate fluids are deposited, on the
other hand, have been less economically valuable. Property interests in
the physical structure and pore space, accordingly, have not been clearly
defined.2 Meanwhile, advancements in technology are enabling greater,
more extensive uses of the subsurface structure and pore space itself.
These include activities associated with energy and natural resources
production, energy storage, and climate change mitigation through carbon
capture and storage (CCS) and other emerging techniques.3 As geologic
reservoir space becomes ever more useful, it is increasingly necessary to
develop a clear regime of property rights to specify how subsurface
owners may act within the reservoir and who may be benefitted and
harmed by reservoir activities.4
Defining ownership of subsurface property is a precondition to defining
tort duties relating to the property.5 Determining which tort applies when
property is harmed depends on the specific property interest that is
injured. Where the right of exclusive possession is injured, the applicable
tort is trespass.6 By comparison, where the right of reasonable use and
enjoyment is injured, the tort is nuisance. Analyzing how courts apply tort
doctrine in subsurface property disputes reveals the nature of property
interests in subsurface reservoir space.7
Proceeding from the implicit assumption that an interest in subsurface
property is fully possessory, courts often call subsurface intrusions
“trespasses.” Yet courts rarely enjoin subsurface intrusions, and they
generally determine liability for damages by balancing the social value of
the actor’s conduct against the gravity of harm to the complaining owner’s

Jack C. Hazlewood, Oil and Gas—Protection of Adjoining Landowners—Drainage in Violation of
Spacing Rules—Loeffler v. King, 29 TEX. L. REV. 111, 111 (1950) (discussing limitations placed on
the rule of capture by conservation laws).
2. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 354–59 (1967) (hypothesizing the emergence of property rights in scarce
resources as a function of their increasing value).
3. See infra section I.B.
4. See id. (discussing property rights primarily as a means of allocating the beneficial and harmful
effects of development of the resource); see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Coordinating the Oil & Gas
Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1543, 1575–76 (2014) (explaining how the definition of subsurface
property rights affects private bargaining among rights holders for use of the subsurface property).
5. Mark D. Christiansen & David E. Pierce, “When the Horizontal and Vertical Collide: Frac Hits
and Operator Quest for Détente in the Common Reservoir,” 61 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 1223 (2015).
6. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939) (defining “nuisance” as a
nontrespassory invasion of a property interest).
7. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, & Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972) (presenting a framework of the
various legal relationships treated by the separate subjects of property and torts).
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ability to use its property.8 Thus, while courts call subsurface invasions
“trespasses,” which would entail a property rule, they most frequently
apply a liability rule resembling the tort of nuisance.9 Like the case law,
much of the growing subsurface property literature nominally advocates
for trespass as the tort to protect subsurface property.10 Also like the cases,
however, the literature tends to modify trespass into a liability rule to
reach desired results.11
Professor Owen Anderson’s pathbreaking scholarship is the most
notable example. Professor Anderson advocates for a modified trespass
regime that would privilege nonconsensual subsurface intrusions
whenever they accomplish an important societal need, and would award
damages to the affected owner only for actual physical harm.12 While
advocating for a liability rule, however, Professor Anderson expressly
rejects a scheme based on nuisance law.13 His reasons include the area’s
historical reputation for being an “impenetrable jungle” and an apparent
preference for strict liability for resulting damages.14 The rest of the
literature has generally overlooked nuisance as an alternative.
This Article analyzes subsurface disputes as nuisances rather than
trespasses. There are compelling reasons to prefer nuisance over trespass
as the doctrinal response to subsurface intrusions. For one, as
demonstrated in detail below, courts’ treatment of subsurface invasions
8. See infra Part IV (reviewing subsurface invasion cases in the contexts of fluid injection,
enhanced oil and gas recovery, natural gas storage, directional drilling and tunneling, and
hydraulic fracturing).
9. See Calabresi & Malemed, supra note 7, at 1092 (describing a property rule as one that protects
the holder of an entitlement to injunction against one who wishes to transfer or destroy the entitlement
and a liability rule as one that provides an entitlement holder damages for the forced transfer or
destruction of the entitlement).
10. Scholars have written much about subsurface property rights, primarily in the context of oil and
gas law. Broader scholarly interest in this area has been spurred recently by the prospect of using
reservoir pore space for sequestering anthropogenic CO2 and other new technologies intended to
mitigate climate change. See Tara K. Righetti, Correlative Rights & Limited Common Property in the
Pore Space: A Response to the Challenge of Subsurface Trespass in Carbon Capture & Sequestration,
47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10420, 10423 nn.33–36 (2017) (collecting scholarship on the
legal viability of CCS projects with respect to potential trespass liability for transboundary migration
of sequestered CO2).
11. See infra section II.B.
12. Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface Is Not His Castle, 49
WASHBURN L.J. 247, 247–51 (2010) [hereinafter Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass]; Owen L.
Anderson, Lord Coke, The Restatement, & Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
ENERGY L. 203, 204–07 (2010–2011) [hereinafter Anderson, Lord Coke].
13. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 12, at 205; Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12,
at 247–48.
14. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 12, at 205; Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note
12, at 247–48 (“Critics may counter that certain types of deep subsurface invasions should not be
within trespass law at all, but that such invasions should be left to the law of nuisance and negligence.
I am reluctant to go this far.”).
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resembles treatment of nuisances, which indicates that the property right
implicated is use and enjoyment rather than possession.15 Additionally,
nuisance protects landowners’ interests with a liability rule, which is more
flexible and context sensitive than a property rule, like trespass. Nuisance
is thus better able to accommodate the factual complexities inherent in
subsurface invasions and coordinate conflicting uses of reservoir space.16
Nuisance also furnishes a wider array of remedies, enabling more efficient
allocation of the costs of reservoir activities among subsurface owners.
Even if analyzing subsurface property disputes as nuisances would not
change the results in many or most cases, doing so would aid the
coherence and predictability of courts’ decision-making. This is not a
trivial benefit. As the fledgling deployment of commercial-scale CCS
illustrates,17 uncertainty in subsurface property rights and liabilities stifles
investment in, and development of, potentially beneficial technologies.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the physical
interconnectedness of subsurface property and the resulting potential for
subsurface use conflicts. Part II examines the doctrinal foundations of the
prevailing exclusionary, or possession-based, view of subsurface property
and reviews related literature. Sections III.A and III.B, respectively,
introduce the history of nuisance law and the version of nuisance adopted
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section III.C theorizes that that an
ownership interest in pore space is not fully possessory and thus not
susceptible of trespass. Part IV attempts to confirm this theory by
examining cases involving fluid injection, enhanced oil and gas recovery,
natural gas storage, directional drilling and tunneling, and hydraulic
fracturing. Part IV also demonstrates how these disputes would be
resolved by expressly applying a nuisance framework. Part IV ends by
discussing the application of nuisance principles to invasions caused by
CCS and other emerging climate change mitigation techniques. Part V
concludes that courts are already engaging in nuisance-like analyses, and
that doing so expressly would aid the coherence of their decisions and
15. See infra Part IV.
16. For a discussion of exclusionary schemes, like trespass, versus governance schemes, like
nuisance, see generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (discussing use in the law of exclusion
strategies, which place all decisions about use of a resource in a single owner, and governance
strategies, which impose on a group of duty holders the task of defining and monitoring proper use of
a common resource); see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance,
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1024–45 (2004) (discussing nuisance’s role in limiting a regime of exclusion
thusly: “Nuisance rests on a foundation of exclusion, whether this is labeled trespass or nuisance, but
it also fine-tunes this hard-edged regime where the stakes are high enough and courts have some
advantage in providing off-the-rack governance rules”).
17. See infra section I.C (discussing the slow roll out of CCS technology due in part to uncertainty
in the legal rules governing liability for CO2 migration).
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reduce one barrier to investment in subsurface technologies: legal
uncertainty.I.The Subsurface: Reservoir
Geology and
Commercial Uses
A.

Reservoir Geology in Brief

The subsurface of the earth is complex. It is presently understood to
consist of basically four internal layers—the crust, mantle, outer core, and
inner core.18 Humans have never penetrated below the crust,19 and it is
within this layer that we have explored and developed commercial uses of
the subsurface. The crust consists of layered beds of rock formations with
differing properties. Like a sponge, the interior of these rock structures
consists of small, interconnected pathways known as pore spaces.20 These
pore spaces are voids in the rock that can contain any number of fluid
substances including air, freshwater, saltwater, and hydrocarbons like oil
and gas.21 Together the physical structure of the rock and these pore
spaces make up the crust of the earth.
A geologic “reservoir” is an interconnected subsurface rock structure
that is under pressure from the overlying rock.22 As the pressure within
one portion of a reservoir changes—for example from a penetrating
wellbore—the pressure will change throughout the reservoir. Changes in
pressure cause the fluids contained within reservoir pore spaces to move
through the interconnected pathways toward areas of lower pressure.23
Fluids flow most freely within rock formations that have high porosity,
meaning the rock has a high ratio of pore space versus solid space, and
high permeability, which signifies a high degree of pore space
interconnectivity.24 Together the properties of porosity and permeability
determine a formation’s suitability as a reservoir for oil or gas, waste
disposal, or, as discussed below, CCS.25

18. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 993 (2008).
19. Id. at 994.
20. LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
21. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423.
22. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 8, 21 (defining a “reservoir” and describing the types of
reservoir drives).
23. See Sidney J. Strong, Application of the Doctrine of Correlative Rights by the State
Conservation Agency in the Absence of Express Statutory Authorization, 28 MONT. L. REV. 205,
passim (1967) (“Unlike solid minerals, oil and gas are fugacious or they tend to migrate from areas
of high pressure to areas of low pressure.” (citing 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 4 (2d ed. 1954);
SULLIVAN, OIL AND GAS LAW § 7 (1955))).
24. Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Geology, The Marcellus Shale, Experts, & Dispute Resolution, 116 W.
VA. L. REV. 865, 876, 884 (2014).
25. Id. at 876.
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Commercial Uses of the Subsurface

Geologic reservoirs have many established and potential commercial
uses, most of which involve exploitation of hydrocarbons contained
within the pore space of the physical strata.26 These activities include the
injection of fluids into subsurface strata for oil and gas production. Some
of the most common fluid injection activities are hydraulic fracturing,27
secondary and enhanced recovery,28 and disposal of produced saltwater as
a byproduct of production.29 When natural gas is produced it is frequently
stored for later sale or use through injection into subsurface reservoirs.
Further, under the federal Underground Injection Control (UIC) program,
hazardous and nonhazardous fluid wastes are injected into relatively deep
reservoirs for disposal.30
In addition to these longstanding subsurface activities, new uses for the
subsurface are emerging. Emerging uses include compressed air energy
storage (CAES) and underground aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) of
groundwater.31 CAES is designed to store surplus electricity produced by
wind power generation to manage the complications imposed by the
inherent intermittence of wind. CAES diverts electricity that would have
otherwise been delivered into the electric grid and uses it to compress and
pump air into deep reservoirs for storage. The air can then be drawn upon
as needed to operate natural gas turbines more efficiently.32 ASR refers to
the injection of freshwater into deep reservoirs for later retrieval.33 Other
26. Modern drilling for oil and gas started in earnest in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 12–15 (Free Press 2009).
With oil and gas drilling came a variety of related underground operations designed to stimulate
production. One early and dramatic example was detonating nitroglycerin in the bottom of a well.
See, e.g., People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 59 (Ind. 1892). After World War II oil and gas
developers began stimulating wells by hydraulically fracturing the productive geologic formations
through injection of pressurized water, sand, and chemicals in a process known as “hydraulic
fracturing” or “fracking.” NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY,
EXPLORATION, DRILLING, & PRODUCTION 423–24 (2d ed. 2001). Together with horizontal drilling,
hydraulic fracturing became a standard means of extracting oil and gas from unconventional, or
“tight,” shale formations previously uneconomic to produce. Id.
27. See infra section IV.E.
28. See infra section IV.B.
29. See infra section IV.A.
30. See infra section IV.A.
31. R. Lee Gresham & Owen L. Anderson, Legal and Commercial Models for Pore-Space Access
and Use for Geologic CO2 Sequestration, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 706–07 (2011).
32. Id. (citing Paul Denholm & Ramteen Sioshansi, The Value of Compressed Air Energy Storage
with Wind in Transmission-Constrained Electric Power Systems, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 3149–50 (2009)).
33. Id. at 707 (citing Peter J. Kiel & Gregory A. Thomas, Banking Groundwater in California: Who
Owns the Aquifer Storage Space?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 25, 25 (2003)). ASR is currently
practiced in certain dry western states including Texas and Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 379-107.5 (West 2020) (authorizing aquifer storage-and-recovery plans in Colorado); TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. §§ 27.151–.157 (West 2020) (authorizing ASR projects).
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uses of the storage capacity of geologic reservoirs are certain to
develop in the future.
Currently, the most notable emerging pore space technology—CCS—
is potentially the most significant and likeliest to lead to complications
with other subsurface activities. CCS emerged as a tool to mitigate climate
change.34 It has the potential to reduce the rate of climate change by
capturing and storing, or “sequestering,” anthropogenic carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions into deep subsurface reservoirs for storage on a geologic
time scale.35 In CCS, “the gas is compressed to a supercritical fluid and
injected a kilometer or deeper in to the microscopic ‘pore space’ in the
deep subsurface rock matrix, displacing the in situ brine,” for instance, the
saltwater naturally in place in the pore space.36
CCS evolved from technologies developed for oil and gas recovery and
storage.37 Depleted oil and gas reservoirs are excellent CO2 storage sites
because they provide adequate pore space capacity and porosity and
permeability, have already been explored and characterized, and can
mostly contain the migration of injected CO2.38 Other types of geologic
formations that are useful for CO2 storage include deep saline reservoirs
and un-mineable coal seams.39 The United States Department of Energy
estimates that the United States has the capacity to store at least 2,400
billion metric tons of man-made CO2.40 This capacity could offset
centuries’ worth of the country’s total CO2 emissions from large
stationary sources.41

34. A consensus of scientists has concluded that control of greenhouse gas emissions is necessary
to avoid “severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems” and significant negative impacts on
public health, agriculture, food supply, forests, water resources, and even energy production itself.
Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and Property
Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368 (2010) (quotations omitted).
35. MICHAEL G. FAURE & ROY A. PARTAIN, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: EFFICIENT LEGAL
POLICIES FOR RISK GOVERNANCE AND COMPENSATION 2 (2017). This Article will refer to the process
as “CCS” for convenience.
36. Klass & Wilson, supra note 34, at 365; see also Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423 (describing
pore space as a “split bone”).
37. FAURE & PARTAIN, supra note 35, at 11.
38. Id. at 16.
39. PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION (CCS)
IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44902.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9CM-FFAC].
40. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE’s Carbon Utilization and Storage Atlas Estimates at Least 2,400
Billion Metric Tons of U.S. CO2 Storage Resource, OFF. FOSSIL ENERGY (Dec. 19, 2012),
https://www.energy.gov/fe/articles/does-carbon-utilization-and-storage-atlas-estimates-least-2400
[https://perma.cc/2QT6-5CMD].
41. FOLGER, supra note 39, at 8.
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Coordinating Conflicting Uses of a Common Reservoir

Because reservoirs are interconnected, any activity in one portion of a
reservoir will to some extent affect the pressure in other parts. By virtue
of porosity and permeability, fluid that is injected into a reservoir tends to
migrate away from the injection location toward areas of lower pressure
and occupy pore spaces in distant parts of the reservoir.42 Subsurface
activities, like hydraulic fracturing and fluid injection and storage, thus
directly and indirectly affect large areas of subsurface property and often
interfere with subsurface activities in other parts of the same reservoir.
This interconnectedness, Professor David Pierce notes, means that “[e]ach
oil and gas reservoir comprises a community of owners.”43 Disputes arise
between members of a reservoir community when one member’s
activities cause changes in pressure and fluid migration in a portion of the
reservoir underlying another member’s land. Such subsurface disputes are
more complex than disputes over the ownership and use of the surface of
property because the subsurface is geologically complex and
hidden from view.44
The history of CCS illustrates the practical problems that arise from
interconnectedness of subsurface property. There has not been large-scale
deployment of existing CCS technology despite abundant potential
storage sites and favorable legislation.45 Commercial CCS projects are
rare—but not necessarily because they are commercially infeasible. A
recently renewed federal tax credit may even make projects economically
attractive.46 A primary obstacle to large-scale deployment of CCS instead
appears to be the extent of subsurface area required for a single storage
facility. This problem arises from the inevitable transboundary migration
of injected CO2.47 Various studies indicate that injected CO2 sequestered

42. LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 16–18.
43. David E. Pierce, Resolving Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling Conflicts Using a Reservoir
Community Analysis, 90 N.D. L. REV. 249, 250 (2014) (citing JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES &
MATERIALS ON OIL & GAS LAW 21 (6th ed. 2013)).
44. See Christopher S. Kulander & R. Jordan Shaw, Comparing Subsurface Trespass Jurisprudence—
Geophysical Surveying and Hydraulic Fracturing, 46 N.M. L. REV. 67, 67–68 (2016).
45. See FOLGER, supra note 39, at 1 (noting a number of bills introduced in the 115th Congress
intended to incentivize implementation of CCS); Klass & Wilson, supra note 34, at 364.
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 45Q (Supp. 2012) (“Credit for carbon dioxide sequestration.”).
47. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 91 n.7 (“Requiring project developers to obtain consent from
all pore-space owners within the migratory path of the CO2 plume could have the practical effect of
prohibiting many sequestration projects.”); Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423 (“Scholars have
recognized the issue of transboundary migration and trespass as critical to the practical, legal, and
economic viability of CCS projects.” (citing James Robert Zadick, The Public Pore Space: Enabling
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Sequestration by Reconceptualizing Subsurface Property Rights, 36
WM. & MARY ENVTL. & POL’Y REV. 257, 269 (2011))).
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in the subsurface could migrate laterally hundreds or thousands of
square miles.48
The propensity of injected CO2 to migrate over such large areas creates
two legal risks that stifle investment in sequestration projects. The first is
the risk of trespass. Under the doctrine of ad coelum, an owner of real
property is deemed to own the earth below the property’s surface
boundaries.49 In much of the United States, land ownership is highly
subdivided into relatively small, separately owned tracts. Consequently,
many owners may have rights in a single reservoir and, migrating CO2
may trespass on the rights of owners far beyond the area acquired for
injection. The theoretical solution, which is not always practically
possible, is to obtain such owners’ consent to use their pore space for
sequestration.50 Second, migrating CO2 may interfere with other
commercial subsurface activities such as primary and enhanced oil
recovery, waste disposal, and natural gas storage. Migration is thus likely
to foment disputes between the CO2 injector and the competing user
unless the competing user has consented.51 The problem is compounded
because CO2 sequestration projects are likely to be sited in depleted oil
and gas reservoirs where preexisting operations for oil and gas recovery
and waste disposal may be ongoing.
While these issues may impact CCS projects especially because of the
size of the subsurface area where sequestered CO2 is likely to migrate,
they arise on some scale any time the subsurface is used for extracting or
injecting fluids. The legal uncertainty helping to stifle large-scale
deployment of CCS illustrates the need for a system of defining and
ordering the competing interests of subsurface rights holders over vast
areas. As discussed in the following section, courts and scholars often
employ a possession-based analysis to resolve competition among
conflicting subsurface activities.

48. LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 91 n.7 (collecting scholarly studies). One study predicted injected
CO2 could disperse over 100 square kilometers within the first 30 years of sequestration. Sprankling,
supra note 18, at 1030.
49. See infra section II.A.1 (discussing the ad coelum doctrine).
50. A few states have enacted unitization statutes for consolidating pore space for CCS. E.g., WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-313 to -316 (West 2020).
51. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 771.
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Discussion of the nature and extent of subsurface ownership starts with
the ad coelum doctrine. The doctrine derives from the Latin maxim cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos, which holds that the
rights of the surface owner extend infinitely upward “to the heavens” and
downward “to hell” or the center of the earth.52 Ad coelum extends surface
boundaries downward, theoretically, to the earth’s core. Noting that the
earth is round, a Louisiana court has pointed out that under ad coelum, “a
surface tract’s subsurface measurement must necessarily narrow as it
approaches the center point of the earth. Ownership of subsurface tracts
equal in size to surface tracts would result in overlapping boundaries as
the available area diminishes.”53 Thus surface property boundaries are not
directly indicative of subsurface boundaries.
Under ad coelum, ownership of the surface of land includes ownership
of the underlying minerals.54 The owner can sever ownership of oil, gas,
and other minerals to create two estates, the mineral estate and the surface
estate, each capable of separate ownership in fee.55 Land titles often
become complex where the surface and mineral estates are partially or
completely severed in this manner. Determining title to the mineral estate
and surface state requires determining title to each component part of the
subsurface.56 It is generally accepted that the subsurface consists of three
basic component parts: (1) the physical strata, or the “subsurface mass,”57
52. Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 71; Sprankling, supra note 18, at 982–84. For a thorough
and persuasive critique of the ad coelum doctrine, see generally Sprankling, supra note 18.
53. Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 959 n.9 (La. 1986).
54. 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 60-1 (1987) (“Ownership of land
carries with it ownership of or the exclusive right to enjoy substances under the surface . . . .”); see,
e.g., De Moss v. Sample, 78 So. 482, 485 (La. 1918) (“It need not be restated that the ownership of
the surface of the earth carries with it the right to the minerals beneath . . . .”).
55. See e.g., De Moss, 78 So. at 482. (“The elements of ownership in land may be severed. The
owner may sell surface rights, and except from the sale the minerals below the surface, and reserve
to himself the right to mine those minerals . . . .”). Courts and scholars quickly understood that ad
coelum was, “inadequate to solve the problems of a substance under the earth, which would migrate
to points of lower pressure caused by punctures of the reservoir by drilling,” and eventually adopted
the rule of capture, the doctrine of correlative rights, and conservation regulation to govern ownership
of oil and gas in common reservoirs. See Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 962 (La.
1986) (quoting H. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 415 (1949)). These principles do not
necessarily apply equally to the rock strata and pore space within which hydrocarbons are found.
56. Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 68.
57. Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 F.3d 431, 442 (5th Cir. 2011).
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that comprises the earth’s structure; (2) the void pore spaces within the
physical strata; and (3) the fluid substances within the pore spaces.58
There is little doubt in any jurisdiction that the owner of the surface
estate owns title to the subsurface mass, and that the mineral estate owner
owns the hydrocarbon substances within the pore spaces. In many states,
however, it is not clear which of the two owns the pore space itself. Some
states have declared by statute that pore space ownership belongs to one
estate or the other, but even clear legislative intent does not necessarily
clarify title.59 The majority rule—among both states with a statutory
declaration and common law states—appears to be that the pore space is
included in the surface estate unless specifically conveyed (or reserved)
in a severance of the mineral estate.60 Thus in a majority of jurisdictions
the surface estate owner is deemed to own fee simple in the physical strata
and pore space underlying the surface boundaries of her tract to the
center of the earth.
2.

Trespass as the Tort Remedy for Injury to Possession

At common law the fee owner holds the absolute exclusive right to
possess the land subject to the fee. The United States Supreme Court has
even said the right to exclude others is “one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”61
Contemporary scholars have gone further and described the right to
exclude as the essential element of property.62 The common law remedy
for enforcing an owner’s exclusive possessory interest in land is the
tort of trespass.

58. See Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423–34 (noting the subsurface is like a “split bone—despite
the calcified and compact exterior, the inside is spongy, or cancellous; between the mesh-like sheets
and spikes of bone are tiny cavities filled with marrow”).
59. See id. at 10424 (discussing several nuances affecting title to pore space even in states with a
clear legislative declaration).
60. Id. at 10425 (citing Stefanie L. Burt, Who Owns the Right to Store Gas: A Survey of Pore Space
Ownership in U.S. Jurisdictions, 4 JOULE DUQ. ENERGY & ENVTL. L.J. (2016), http://www.
duqlawblogs.org/joule/wp-content/ uploads/2016/07/Who-Owns-the-Right-to-Store-Gas-A-Surveyof-Pore-Space-Ownership-in-U.S.-Jurisdictions-.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2020)). Certain states, like
Kansas, have not directly addressed the pore space ownership question but have held that the surface
estate is entitled to authorize fluid injection, which strongly implies ownership of the pore space. See
Dick Props., LLC v. Paul H. Bowman Tr., 221 P.3d 618, 618 ¶¶ 1–6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010).
61. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
62. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and The Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998); see
also Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75 (1985) (stating
that at common law first possession was the root of title).
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Modern treatises define trespass as the “wrongful interference with the
right of exclusive possession of real property.”63 At early common law
trespass included several different actions, each directed at a different
kind of wrong. Trespass quare clausum fregit (“breaking a close”) was
limited to direct physical invasions of exclusive possession. As one early
twentieth century court explained, “[i]t is, of course, axiomatic that at
common law the gist of the action of trespass quare clausum fregit is
injury to the possession, and that, generally speaking, the plaintiff must
show actual or constructive possession at the time of the trespass.”64
Contrastingly “indirect and consequential” injuries arising from
nonphysical invasions were remedied under the writ of trespass on the
case.65 Trespass on the case was also brought to enforce nonpossessory,
or incorporeal, property rights like easements and licenses.66 Unlike
trespass quare clausum fregit, trespass on the case required proof of actual
injury and did not entitle the plaintiff to ejectment or nominal damages.67
Claims of nuisance were, under the writ system, brought as claims for
trespass on the case.68
The traditional common law remedies for trespass quare clausum fregit
were designed to enforce the owner’s exclusivity of possession. That
design is reflected in the modern remedies for trespass: injunctive relief,
ejectment, restitution, and nominal and compensatory damages.69
Recovery for trespass quare clausum fregit is allowed without proof of
damages. Rather “the law infers some damage without proof of actual

63. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 2 (2019) (“The tort of trespass applies to the wrongful interference with
the right of exclusive possession of real property . . . .”).
64. Slye v. Guerdrum, 29 App. D.C. 550, 552 (D.C. 1907).
65. See Sutherland v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 595 P.2d 780, 783 (Okla. 1979) (discussing the
“ancient subtleties” that characterized the writ system).
66. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Distinguishing Trespass and Nuisance: A Journey Through a
Shifting Borderland, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 253 (1991).
67. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 9–10 (Tex. 2008) (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 78 (5th ed. 1984)).
68. Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PENN. L. REV. 631, 652 (1928).
American courts largely abandoned the common law forms of action and the writ system in the latter
half of the nineteenth century. Stephen C. Dillard et al., Nuisance Cases Against Energy Companies
in Texas, Pennsylvania, and Other Areas with Significant or Developing Oil and Gas Exploration, 59
S. TEX. L. REV. 447, 450–53 (2018). Yet some jurisdictions still recognize trespass on the case as a
cause of action for interference with a nonpossessory interest in land. As the Texas Supreme Court
(which still recognizes an action for trespass on the case by owners of nonpossessory interests)
reminded the plaintiffs in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., “[a]t common law, trespass
included several actions directed to different kinds of wrongs. Trespass quare clausum fregit was
limited to physical invasions of plaintiff’s possessory interest in land; trespass on the case was not.”
268 S.W.3d at 9 (internal citations omitted).
69. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10429 (collecting authorities for each remedy).
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injury” from direct invasions of property.70 The inference of damages is
justified by a variety of policy reasons including “to prevent the
acquisition of a prescriptive right, to settle a dispute regarding title, to
vindicate a property right, and because trespass was so likely in early
times to lead to a breach of the peace.”71 The presumption of damages is
necessary to protect the owner’s exclusivity of possession, which is
injured by the mere fact of an unauthorized invasion. Requiring an owner
to show actual damages to recover for a trespass, on the other hand,
“‘would place a premium on trespassing’ by ‘mak[ing] the position of the
trespasser more favorable’” than that of the owner.72
Common law trespass is subject to few defenses. The primary defense
for nonnegligent trespasses—necessity—is narrow. Necessity allows
unauthorized entry when it is reasonably necessary to preserve property
or life, prevent serious bodily harm to a third person, or escape bodily
injury.73 Even where the defense applies, the resulting privilege is
incomplete because the actor remains liable for compensating the property
owner for actual damages caused by the privileged trespass.74
Courts’ application of trespass quare clausum fregit has evolved to
conform to modern realities. For example some states still follow the
traditional rule (or, sometimes, the “dimensional test”) requiring a direct
invasion by an object that is visible to the human eye to constitute a
trespass.75 Many other states, recognizing the lesson of particle physics
that energy and matter are equal, have rejected the dimensionality test in
favor of focusing on the type of interest invaded. The leading case
rejecting the dimensionality test is Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.76 There,
70. 17A CARMODY-WAIT NEW YORK PRACTICE, Nominal Damages in Actions for Trespass to
Land § 107:137 (2d. ed. 2019) (emphasis added).
71. Page Keeton & Lee Jones, Jr., Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry II, 39 TEX. L. REV.
253, 256–57 (1961).
72. Sakele Bros., LLC v. Safdie, 302 A.D.2d 20, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (quoting De Camp v.
Bullard, 54 N.E. 26, 28 (N.Y. 1899)). For example, under the traditional view of trespass the owner
of Blackacre would be entitled to sue his neighbor for nominal damages and ejectment in response to
her neighbor’s crossing Blackacre as a shortcut to a public street even if Blackacre suffered no harm.
In fact, the owner of Blackacre would have a legal obligation to sue to prevent the neighbor from
gaining a prescriptive right in Blackacre. See Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43
GONZ. L. REV. 271, 309–10 (2008). Without an inference of damages enabling Blackacre’s owner to
sue for ejectment, the neighbor’s trespass would effectively be privileged over the owner’s right of
exclusive possession, and Blackacre’s owner would have no legal remedy to prevent loss of title by
prescription or adverse possession. See generally Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict
Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1926)
(describing the defense of necessity to trespass as an “incomplete privilege”).
73. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 36 (2019).
74. Bohlen, supra note 72, at 312–13.
75. Bortland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979) (citing 1 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 1.23 (1946)).
76. 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) (en banc).
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the Oregon Supreme Court held that intrusion by invisible fluoride
particles constituted a trespass.77 The court theorized that the “direct” and
“physical” elements of a traditional common law tort action were merely
judges’ attempt to describe the types of invasions that interfere with
possession.78 In discerning the appropriate cause of action as between
trespass and nuisance in a borderline case, the Martin Court focuses on
the nature of the interest impacted by the defendant’s conduct instead of
the physical nature of the intrusion.79
Trespass and ad coelum also morphed to meet modern needs in the
form of commercial air travel. In 1946 the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Causby80 noted that ad coelum has no place in the
modern world and held that a landowner has no common law right to stop
airplane flights high over her property.81 Under Causby and its progeny,
landowners are entitled to damages for actual injury caused by use of the
airspace above their land but not to any remedy for the unauthorized entry
of the property itself.82 The Restatement (Second) of Torts incorporated
Causby’s conception of airspace trespass.83 Courts continued to label air
invasions as “trespasses” for decades until eventually coming to view
“that any liability should be in nuisance and should thus depend on
whether there was unreasonable and substantial interference with
the surface.”84
While courts were expressly limiting the ad coelum doctrine in the
context of overlying airspace they were also implicitly limiting its
application to the underlying subsurface.85 As examined closer below,86
the advent of modern hydrocarbon production techniques triggered a spate
of litigation over subsurface interferences. These disputes have resulted
in a multitude of doctrinally confused, logically inconsistent, resultoriented decisions.87 A sizeable literature considering the rights and
77. Id. at 797.
78. Id. at 793.
79. Id. at 794 (“Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion which invades the
possessor’s protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible
pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical language of
a physicist.”).
80. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
81. Id. at 261.
82. See Reynolds, supra note 66, at 235–36.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1969).
84. Reynolds, supra note 66, at 236–37.
85. See Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 73; see also infra Part IV.
86. See infra Part IV.
87. See, e.g., Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 723 (“However, the case law is neither
entirely unified nor coherent.”); Sprankling, supra note 18, at 1020 (noting the inconsistency in case
law dealing with landowners’ rights more than two miles below the surface).
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Subsurface Ownership Literature

Commentators have advanced multiple models of subsurface property.
Several commentators urge eliminating any private property rights in the
deep subsurface and making it a public domain.88 Others would empower
private actors to employ eminent domain authority to consolidate pore
space within a common reservoir for specific purposes such as CCS
projects.89 While approaches like these may be effective in encouraging
deployment of particular technologies like CCS, they take a piecemeal
approach to governing use of the subsurface. They would also require
significant legislation and the creation of new bureaucracies
for implementation.
Even where a regulatory regime authorizes the creation of compulsory
units of property for particular subsurface activities, those units must
necessarily share boundaries with non-unitized property. And because
administrative agencies typically lack the authority to adjudicate common
law causes of action or license private actors to commit torts,90 the
creation of a unit for any particular purpose may not preclude an action
by an owner outside of the unit for common law trespass.91 Therefore,
even where subsurface rights are consolidated administratively, it is
necessary to determine the extent of the ownership rights of
nonconsenting owners.
Other scholars have advanced alternative models of subsurface
property that could address all kinds of subsurface uses and interferences.
Two predominant models have emerged—one that views subsurface
rights within a trespass-based framework and one that focuses instead on

88. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10434 (citing Spranking, supra note 18, at 1032; A. Bryan Endres,
Geologic Carbon Sequestration: Balancing Efficiency Concerns and Public Interest in Property
Rights Allocations, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 623, 646–49 (2011); Kevin L. Doran & Angela M. Cifor,
Does the Federal Government Own the Pore Space Under Private Lands in the West?, 42 ENVTL. L.
527, 545 (2012); Zadick, supra note 47; Will Reisinger et al., Reconciling King Coal and Climate
Change: A Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 33
(2009)). Professor Wiseman would not abolish private rights but has suggested the need for public
intervention in coordination of subsurface rights in the form of “subsurface comprehensive planning
and zoning.” Wiseman, supra note 4, at 1576.
89. See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 34, at 425.
90. See Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 734–35 (noting that “[a]s with title issues,
regulatory bodies have no general authority to authorize trespasses or other torts,” and citing cases).
91. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10437 (citing Bruce M. Kramer, Horizontal Drilling and Trespass:
A Challenge to the Norms of Property and Tort Law, 25 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL.
L. REV. 291 (2014)).
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the correlative nature of subsurface property. The following subsections
will briefly review the two dominant models.
1.

Focusing on Possession: The Subsurface Trespass Model

A majority of the literature advocates for application of a modified
approach to subsurface trespass similar to the modern trespass rule
established in Causby.92 The leading voice in this area is Professor Owen
Anderson.93 Anderson concludes that “[w]henever the trespasser’s
subsurface intrusion accomplishes an important societal need, including
private commercial needs, and so long as the subsurface owner suffers no
actual and substantial damages, subsurface trespass should not be
actionable.”94 Under this regime courts may not enjoin subsurface
intrusions deemed socially desirable that do not cause actual harm.95
However, where an intrusion causes damage beyond the fact of the
intrusion to the complaining owner, the trespasser would be strictly liable
for compensation.96 Anderson states that his approach redefines a fee
interest in subsurface property so as not to encompass the right to exclude
socially desirable intrusions. Per Anderson, “property . . . denote[s] legal
relations between persons with respect to a thing,” and so, “[w]hile the
right to exclude trespassers is a fundamental incident of property
ownership, the right, like other incidents, neither is nor should be
absolute.”97 Stated another way, Anderson’s approach modifies trespass
from a property rule into a liability rule under which the owner is not
entitled to injunction to protect its entitlement but instead may only obtain
compensatory damages for infringement of its entitlement.98
Aspects of Professor Anderson’s subsurface “trespass” rule closely
resemble principles of nuisance law, particularly as reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Professor Anderson’s standard, for
example, would consider the “societal need” for the interfering activity
and the degree of harm to the complaining party in a sort of “balance of
utilities” test.99 Yet Anderson expressly rejects nuisance as an analytical
92. See generally, e.g., Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12; Anderson, Lord Coke,
supra note 12; Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines, Is There an
Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361 (2014).
93. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12, at 247.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 248.
96. Id.
97. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 12, at 203–04 (internal citations omitted).
98. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1089.
99. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12, at 248 (citing as an artificial barrier N.D.
CENT. CODE § 42-02-12 (2009), which immunizes activities expressly authorized by law from being
nuisances).
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tool in resolving subsurface-use disputes.100 In support he cites the oftquoted passage from Prosser and Keeton on Torts, which describing
nuisance law as an “impenetrable jungle.”101 He also references certain
artificial barriers several jurisdictions have raised to nuisance claims.
The substance of Anderson’s brief critique of nuisance law, however,
appears to be a preference for a strict liability standard: “[W]hen one
intentionally injects a substance that physically invades the subsurface of
a neighboring landowner, money damages should be recoverable for any
actual and substantial damage caused without having to engage in the
uncertainty of balancing whether the gravity of harm to the landowner
outweighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct.”102 The discussion below
will evaluate the merits of a strict-liability approach
like Professor Anderson’s.103
2.

Focusing on Correlative Rights: Reservoir Community Analysis

The alternative model of analyzing disputes over common subsurface
property is Professor David Pierce’s “reservoir community analysis.”104
Pierce’s analysis focuses on the physical interconnectedness of common
reservoirs rather than the artificial legal boundaries separating tracts of
property at the surface.105 Reservoir community analysis “defines the
rights and obligations of the owners in the oil and gas reservoir by
recognizing that the owners coexist in a common environment instead of
the artificial compartmentalized environment” created under a strict
application of ad coelum.106 This mode of analysis would resolve
intrareservoir disputes, like intrusions from hydraulic fracturing, by
balancing the positive and negative correlative rights of the interest
owners competing for exclusive control of the subsurface.107

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 181–88.
104. David E. Pierce, Employing a Reservoir Community Analysis to Define and Marshal
Correlative Rights in the Oil and Gas Reservoir, 76 LA. L. REV. 787 (2016) [hereinafter Pierce,
Employing a Reservoir Community Analysis].
105. See generally, e.g., Pierce, supra note 43; David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch:
Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 241
(2011) [hereinafter Pierce, Carol Rose]; David E. Pierce, Developing a Correlative Rights Doctrine
to Accommodate Development of Oil and Gas in Arkansas, 68 ARK. L. REV. 407 (2015); Pierce,
Employing a Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 104.
106. Pierce, Carol Rose, supra note 105, at 242.
107. Pierce, Employing Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 104, at 795–96.

13 Schremmer.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

GETTING PAST POSSESSION

4/28/20 6:44 PM

333

Professor Tara Righetti has applied reservoir community analysis to
intrareservoir disputes in the context of CCS.108 Under Righetti’s analysis,
“rather than focusing on the creation or abolishment of property rights in
the subsurface, the application of correlative rights reframes the interests
in the CCS ‘storage complex’ as a form of ‘limited common property’
wherein possessive rights are more appropriately allocated according to
principles of proportionate use and enjoyment.”109 Limited common
property is described by Professor Carol Rose as an intermediate stage
between fully public and fully private property in which property is held
in common by members of a particular group—a “reservoir community”
in Pierce’s model—but is held by the group to the exclusion of
all others.110
Although a full discussion of the relationship between nuisance and
correlative rights doctrine, limited common property, and reservoir
community analysis exceeds the scope of this Article, it is submitted that
one can view nuisance as the tort-law counterpart of the property-law
doctrine of correlative rights.111 As the tort of trespass protects against
invasions of possessory property rights, the tort of nuisance protects
against invasions of correlative property rights.
III. NUISANCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
SUBSURFACE TRESPASS
As this Part details, nuisance is a more context-sensitive model of
governance than the exclusionary rule of trespass and therefore is better
suited for coordinating conflicting uses of interconnected subsurface
property.112 By applying nuisance, courts would have greater flexibility in
tailoring efficient and equitable remedies when an unjustifiable
108. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10420.
109. Id. at 10433 (citing Carol Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 132 (1998)) (emphasis added).
110. Carol Rose, Energy & Efficiency in the Realignment of Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261
(1990). As Rose has noted, effective administration of limited common property, in which owners’
rights are correlative, often requires active regulation by a state actor. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, & Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 719–20
(1986); see also Hall, supra note 92, at 363, 406 (arguing that adoption of a “modern” trespass rule
privilege subsurface interferences would lead to waste of underground resources absent close
regulation by conservation authorities).
111. See generally Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer & the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, &
Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 199 n.65 (1990) (discussing the evolution of the correlative rights
doctrine from the predominate nineteenth century view of property as a natural right and noting the
correlative rights “compromise” eventually failed, leading to the positivist view of property enshrined
in the Restatement of Torts).
112. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 557,
559–60 nn.2–4 (1992) (explaining the distinction between standards and rules as the extent to which
“efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before [(rules)] or after [(standards)] the act”).
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interference occurs. Application of nuisance would allow courts to temper
harsh outcomes that might result under strict liability. One indication that
nuisance is the appropriate remedy for subsurface property invasions is
that, despite speaking in terms of trespass, courts already apply nuisance
principles to resolve such cases. A review of the cases113 demonstrates that
nuisance is already the de facto tort regime for subsurface interferences.
It could only improve the clarity and consistency of courts’ treatment of
these cases to expressly articulate the principles that
implicitly guide decisions.
A.

Nuisance Law: A Jungle No More

The aim of nuisance law “is to achieve efficient and equitable solutions
to problems created by discordant land uses.”114 Fundamentally, the law
of nuisance mediates between two conflicting rights: “property owners
have a right to control their land and use it to benefit their best interests,
while the public and neighboring land owners have a right to prevent
unreasonable use which substantially impairs the peaceful use and
enjoyment of other land.”115 Paradigmatic nuisance cases involve suits to
enjoin or recover damages caused by the negative externalities of
otherwise socially valuable activities, such as stenches and fumes emitted
from landfills,116 sewage treatment plants,117 agricultural activities,118 or
industrial facilities like cement plants.119 Nuisance liability attaches for
unjustified interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land
regardless of whether the plaintiff’s right to exclude the defendant has
been infringed.

113. See infra Part IV.
114. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 1 (2019); see also Carroll v. Absolute Tank Removal, LLC, 834 A.2d
823, 824 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (“Historically, private nuisance law has been used ‘as a means of
efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses. All of the very
useful and sophisticated economic analyses of private nuisance remedies published in recent years
proceed on the basis that the goal of nuisance law is to achieve efficient and equitable solutions to
problems created by discordant land uses.’”).
115. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 1 (emphasis added).
116. E.g., Miller v. Jasniski, 705 S.W.2d 442 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986).
117. E.g., Adams v. Ark. City, 362 P.2d 829 (Kan. 1961). In water or sewage back-up cases liability
usually lies in both nuisance and trespass. It is telling that a single occurrence can give rise to both
torts. Trespass and nuisance are not mutually exclusive because they are causes of action for
interference with distinct property interests—possession and use, respectively. See William L.
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 414 (1942).
118. One early leading nuisance decision, for example, involved an action on the case for nuisance
against the defendant for constructing a hog sty near the plaintiff’s house. William Aldred’s Case
[1610], 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 9 Coke Rep. 57b.
119. E.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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Characterizations of nuisance as a “jungle” focus primarily on the tort’s
admittedly tangled history.120 According to Prosser, nuisance was long
used as “a sort of legal garbage can” and a “substitute for any thought
about a problem.”121 Prosser summarized the history of nuisance
as follows:
The uncertainty has been due largely to the series of historical
accidents by which nuisance came to cover the invasion of
different, and unrelated, kinds of interests and to refer to various
kinds of conduct on the part of the defendant. The word first
appears in connection with interferences with servitudes or other
rights to the free use of land. There was an old criminal writ (the
assize of nuisance), affording incidental civil relief, which was
designed to cover invasions of the plaintiff’s land due to conduct
wholly on the land of the defendant. In time this was supplanted
by the more convenient action on the case for nuisance, which
was limited strictly to interference with the use or
enjoyment of land.122
Other commentators explain that, in its earliest form in the English legal
system, nuisance was brought under a distinct common law writ. By the
late fourteenth century lawyers largely abandoned the old writ and started
suing under the newly recognized cause of action for trespass on the case,
which often proved more strategic and convenient.123 The eventual
elimination of the forms of action allowed courts and scholars flexibility
to reimagine tort doctrine in general.124 According to Professor Dobbs,
understanding of nuisance law became clearer following abolition as
people grasped, first, that public and statutory nuisance cases should be
analyzed separately from private nuisances and, second, that “private
nuisance does not describe any particular conduct of the defendant, but a
type of harm suffered by the plaintiff—impaired enjoyment of
rights in land.”125
Much of this clarification was accomplished in the Restatement of
Torts. The Restatement defined private nuisance as a tort based on the
nature of the interest invaded rather than the nature of the conduct giving
rise to the invasion.126 One observer observed that it recast nuisance law
120. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 398 (2d ed. 2018). For an excellent and thorough
history of the development of nuisance law, see Lewin, supra note 111, at 192.
121. Prosser, supra note 117, at 410.
122. Id. at 410–11; see also Lewin, supra note 111, at 192.
123. Dillard et al., supra note 68, at 450–53; see also Ball, supra note 68, at 652.
124. Dillard et al., supra note 68, at 450–53.
125. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 398 (emphasis added).
126. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 40, at 218–20 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
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as a “utilitarian calculus in which property rights were defined with the
aim of achieving the greatest social good. By the Restatement’s definition,
private nuisance is any claim involving “a non-trespassory invasion of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment in land,”127 further
clarifying that “nuisance” describes the property right that is injured rather
than the condition that causes injury. Actionable invasions could be either
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and otherwise actionable
under other torts like negligence or strict liability for
ultrahazardous conduct.
Section 826 defined “unreasonable” conduct by quantitatively
weighing the “utility of the actor’s conduct” against “the gravity of harm”
in what came to be known as the “balance of utilities test.”128 Under the
test, conduct that damages another’s interest in the use of her land may be
conducted without liability if its social utility is sufficiently great to justify
the harm done. This was not a new concept in the law; it had previously
been expressed as balancing the parties’ respective interests as opposed to
the utility of their respective uses.129
B.

The Restatement (Second)’s Approach to Nuisance

The Restatement (Second) of Torts retains the cost–benefit calculation
embodied in the balance of utilities test but was amended to account for a
large number of cases imposing strict liability for conduct that was not
characterized as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous.130 The
amendment resulted in the addition of section 829A, which imposes
liability where an invasion is so substantial that the plaintiff should not be
compelled to suffer it without compensation even if the defendant is
without fault and the conduct is not abnormally dangerous.
While many courts apply a nuisance doctrine similar to that articulated
in the Restatement (Second), not as many have expressly adopted the
entirety of the Restatement (Second).131 Given the diversity in private
nuisance law across jurisdictions, however, the discussion in the
remainder of this Article will refer to the Restatement (Second) as the

127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).
128. Id. § 826(a); see also Lewin, supra note 111, at 211.
129. Comment a to section 826 of the Restatement (Second) cites an early case involving candlemaking where it was found there was no public nuisance because “[l]e utility del chose excusera le
noisomeness del stink.” Id. § 826 cmt. a (citing STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 106 (1890)).
130. See Lewin, supra note 111, at 222.
131. See id. at 234–35.
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generic standard.132 The following outline of its essential provisions will
thus aid the subsequent discussion.
Section 822 defines a private nuisance as a legal cause of invasion of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land that is
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise
actionable as negligence, recklessness, or strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities.133 Sections 826 through 831 contain standards for
determining when an invasion is “unreasonable” under 822(a). Section
826 instructs that an invasion is unreasonable if (a) the gravity of the harm
outweighs the utility of the conduct (i.e., the balance of utilities test), or
(b) the harm caused by the conduct is “serious” and the financial burden
of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the
continuation of the conduct infeasible.134
Under section 826 the utility of an activity is not weighed in a vacuum
but is evaluated with reference to what is done about its consequences.
Hence a cement plant’s “utility” would be greater if it pays compensation
to its neighbors for harm done than if it does not.135 Under subsection (b),
conduct is “unreasonable” even if its utility outweighs the gravity of harm
caused if the harm is “serious” and it would not render the conduct
infeasible to continue if compensation were awarded.136 If the burden of
making compensation would potentially put the conduct out of business,
courts conduct a weighing process as it would occur in a claim
for injunction.137
The gravity of the harm is determined under section 827 based on the
following factors: (a) the extent of the harm; (b) the character of the harm;
(c) the social value of the use invaded; (d) the suitability of the use
invaded to the character of the locality; and (e) the burden of the person
harmed in avoiding the harm.138 The utility of conduct is determined under
section 828 based on similar factors: (a) social value of the conduct;
(b) suitability of the conduct to the character of locality; and
(c) impracticability of avoiding the invasion.139
132. This Article’s use of the Restatement (Second) as the standard for nuisance doctrine is not
intended as an endorsement of its utility-balancing approach, which has been subjected to powerful
criticism. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979) (criticizing utilitarian approaches to defining property rights
and nuisance law).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
134. Id. § 826.
135. Id. § 826 cmt. e.
136. Id. § 826(b).
137. Id. § 826 cmt. f.
138. Id. § 827.
139. Id. § 828.
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Section 831 deems conduct to be unreasonable if it is unsuited to the
character of the locality and causes significant harm to a use that is well
suited to the locality.140 Finally section 829A incorporates the
compensation principle, noted above, by deeming otherwise justifiable
conduct unreasonable “if the harm resulting from the invasion is severe
and greater than the other should be required to bear without
compensation.”141
C.

The Nonpossessory Nature of Subsurface Property Intrusions

Courts often conflate trespass with nuisance, labelling conduct a
“trespass” but applying nuisance standards to resolve it.142 Indeed trespass
and nuisance border each other and can both arise from one incident.143
But trespass and nuisance are distinct because they exist to protect
different property rights. One act can occasion both an invasion of
another’s right of possession (a trespass) and her right of reasonable use
and enjoyment (a nuisance). It follows that only owners whose property
interests are possessory may sue for trespass.144 While courts have not
explicitly classified subsurface property as possessory or nonpossessory,
as Professor Righetti notes, this classification “may prove dispositive as
to the remedies available to owners for subsurface intrusions.”145
Consequently, in distinguishing trespass and nuisance as alternative tort
remedies for invasions of subsurface property, it is essential to first
examine, as the following section does, whether subsurface property is
possessory or nonpossessory.
140. Id. § 831.
141. Id. § 829A. Per Professor Lewin,
Any inquiry by a court should start with section 829A, for if the harm is sufficiently ‘severe,’
the plaintiff is entitled to compensation in damages regardless of the utility of the defendant’s
activity and regardless of whether damage liability would cause the defendant to cease the
activity. If the damage is not sufficiently ‘severe’ to trigger section 829A, it may nevertheless be
‘serious’ enough to warrant compensation under section 826(b) without regard to the utility of
the defendant’s activity, but only if damage liability would not cause the defendant to cease the
activity. Finally, if the plaintiff’s damages were not severe enough to warrant compensation
under section 829A and the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation under section 826(b)—
either because the damages were not sufficiently serious or because damage liability would cause
cessation of the activity—the plaintiff might still be entitled to compensation (as well as an
injunction) under the balance of utilities test.
Lewin, supra note 111, at 227.
142. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 399.
143. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 399; Reynolds, supra note 66, at 228.
144. See Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 70 (collecting cases); Louise A. Halper, Nuisance,
Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeal, 1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 341–42
(1990) (discussing nuisance as the traditional cause of action to remedy injuries to nonpossessory
property interests).
145. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10428–29.
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What Is “Possession”?

The root of all title to property at common law is first possession.146
Possession grants the possessor the right to exclude others from the thing
possessed. To modern theorists, possession is the sina qua non of
property. As Professor Thomas Merrill explains, “Give someone the right
to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce
relative to the human demand for it, and you give them property. Deny
someone the exclusion right and they do not have property.”147 All other
rights associated with ownership of property, according to Professor
Merrill, derive from and depend on the right to exclude.
Carol Rose has identified two “great principles” defining the meaning
of “possession”: “(1) notice to the world of a claim to property through a
clear act, and (2) reward to useful labor.”148 The rationale of granting
possession to reward useful labor is subsumed in Rose’s first definition
because application of useful labor to a thing is itself an act giving notice
to the world.149 To Rose, possession is a kind of statement communicating
the speaker’s claim over a thing to an audience comprised of all others
who might be interested in claiming the thing themselves. The purpose of
the statement is to establish the right to exclude. Dean Wigmore defines
possession of real property similarly: “Possession is a relation of control
of a thing as against other persons. A possession consists of two elements,
with reference to the area deemed to be possessed, (a) the area actually
controlled against others by the bodily force of the person; [and] (b) the
area willed by him to be included in his potential control, as expressed in
his acts of will.”150 To Wigmore the “potential control” appears to be
tantamount to constructive possession and stretches as far as the possessor
is able to indicate through acts of expression.
Legal rules designate the types of statements that constitute notice of
an exclusive claim to the relevant audience.151 Possession of the surface
area of real property is usually marked by fences or cultivation, or
constructively by legal descriptions in deeds.152 Once established,
possession can be lost by failing to communicate the claim continually
146. Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Rose, supra
note 62, at 75.
147. Merrill, supra note 62, at 730.
148. Rose, supra note 62, at 77–78, 83.
149. Id.
150. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS WITH NOTES & A SUMMARY
OF PRINCIPLES app’x A, § 118 (1912).
151. Rose, supra note 62, at 87–88. To establish claims to objects of nature, like land, the law has
designated the statements of “cultivation, manufacture, and development.” Id.
152. WIGMORE, supra note 150, app’x A, § 118.
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and allowing another to invade the object and communicate a superior
claim.153 Possessors must guard against such invaders, which they can do
either through self-help ejectment or an action for trespass.154
Some things, like easements,155 are inherently incapable of clear
demarcation and thus of possession. Claims to these things are established
only through systems of secondary demarcation like land records.156 Other
things, like the airspace above land, are often said to be capable only of
limited or “effective possession.”157 An early twentieth century
commentator noted that under this view, “[a] man cannot own air in its
free state; the rule is universal. A man may have an easement for light, or
an easement for free access of air, or a right against the pollution of his
air, but the air itself he cannot own.”158 An early court explained the
property interest in airspace likewise, stating, “[i]t would be vain to treat
property in airspace upon the same footing as property which can be
seized, touched, occupied, handled, cultivated, built upon and utilized in
every feature.”159 Thus, authorities tend to speak of the surface owner as
possessing the airspace above her land only as far as it is necessary to
support her use and enjoyment of the land.160
2.

Is the Subsurface Property Interest Possessory?

Like airspace, the deep subsurface cannot be seized, touched, or
utilized as readily as the surface of land. Unlike airspace, the deep
subsurface is impossible to efficiently demarcate through use or
development as to communicate an exclusive claim, except indirectly

153. Rose, supra note 62, at 78–79, 81.
154. These legal actions were originally intended to avoid breaches of the peace that often
accompany the alternative remedy of self-help. Bohlen, supra note 72, at 318–19, 19 n.19; Henry E.
Smith, Self-Help & the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 81–86 (2005).
155. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “easement” as, “[a]n interest in land owned by another
person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific
limited purpose (such as to cross it for access to a public road).” Easement, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
156. Rose, supra note 62, at 83.
157. Leo Jaffe, Air Law—Trespass by Airplane, 9 TEX. L. REV. 240, 243 (1931). The concept of
“effective possession” was criticized widely by contemporary scholars for being obscure and
“difficult of both definition and application.” Ball, supra note 68, at 641–42.
158. Ball, supra note 68, at 632–33.
159. Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 390 (Mass. 1930).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (“The landowner owns at least
as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”). The
fact that courts view the airspace as only an effective possessory interest has played a role in the
abandonment of trespass rules in favor of nuisance in airspace overflight cases. See Reynolds, supra
note 66, at 235–37.
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through possession of the surface, because it is hidden from view.161 In
addition, a pore space-owner has no practical means excluding others
from invading its claimed pore space, except perhaps at great expense.162
Further, and perhaps more important, it is highly difficult even with expert
evidence to monitor the subsurface to determine whether an invasion of
pore space has occurred.163 Thus, although the substances contained
within pore space may be deemed subject to possession while in place,164
the pore space itself is no more, and perhaps less, susceptible of
possession than the airspace.
This last conclusion is loosely consistent with Dean Wigmore’s view
of subterranean land ownership. In Wigmore’s conception a landowner
can possess only the surface area. The surface includes certain
“appurtenant rights” in subjacent and superjacent space. Per Wigmore,
“The space subjacent to the land is included without limit as to distance
downwards. The right in this aspect protects merely against an intrusion
into the lower soil or a removal of it. But an act which causes the surface
to fall is a violation of the main right.”165 The appurtenance Wigmore
161. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 163–64. As Lowe et al. explain, adverse possession requires
open and notorious conduct for the statutory period in order to give notice of the adverse possessor’s
claim to the true owner. Hence, where the mineral estate has been severed prior to the beginning of
an adverse possession, the possessor’s use of the surface will not ripen into title to the mineral estate
as well. Id.
162. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., LC, 351 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (“Mineral
owners can protect their interests from drainage through means such as pooling or drilling their own
wells. This is not necessarily the case when a landowner is trying to protect his or her subsurface from
migrating wastewater.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Righetti, supra note 10, at 10428
(“Owners of pore space may develop their interest into a stronger possessory claim based on their
use, and yet at any time prior to that use, they are also subject to dispossession by virtue of their
neighbor’s use.”). It appears dispossession by a neighbor is equally possible after a subsurface owner
“uses” her pore space because pore space “can be filled, emptied and refilled” at any time. See id.
163. See, e.g., Hill v. Sw. Energy Co., 858 F.3d 481, 485–87 (8th Cir. 2017) (reviewing district
court’s exclusion of expert testimony pertaining to the spread of injected “fracking waste”); Raymond
v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 272 n.7 (E.D. La. 1988) (“Considering the expert
testimony in this case regarding the uncertainty of determining if, when, and where injected salt water
might migrate, it is unlikely that an operator would undertake to execute leases with all landowners
under whose property injected salt water might migrate.”); Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488
So.2d 955, 959 n.9 (La. 1986) (“Noting that the earth is round, we point out that a surface tract’s
subsurface measurement must necessarily narrow as it approaches the center point of
the . . . boundaries as the available area diminishes. Just how much or how little plaintiff’s subsurface
ownership has narrowed at a depth of two miles is a peripheral question which, needless to say, will
not be addressed in this opinion.”); Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 993 (Ohio 1996)
(“All of these and more disputed variables went into the construction of the hypothetical models that
attempted to illustrate the lateral extent of the migration. Given all these variables, there were great
difficulties in appellants’ establishing, as a factual matter, that a property invasion had occurred, so
that appellants’ claim must be regarded as somewhat speculative.”).
164. Some states characterize interests in minerals, such as oil and gas, in place, before production,
as possessory and others do not. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 17–75 (discussing mineral
ownership theories across jurisdictions).
165. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 150, app’x A, § 104.
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describes is negative in nature. It is a right to be free from conditions in
superjacent and subjacent space that diminish the surface area’s
habitability or availability for economic use.166 Wigmore’s appurtenances
are probably classifiable as incorporeal hereditaments—nonpossessory
rights attached to ownership of land.167 Doctrinally, after the writ system,
the only tort generally available to remedy an invasion of a nonpossessory
interest in real property is nuisance; trespass is not available where there
is no violation of a right to exclude.168
It should be no surprise then that, while purporting to apply trespass,
courts in subsurface invasion cases apply nuisance-like standards. One
inference to draw from these cases is that the owner of a fee interest in
real property owns a nonpossessory interest in the subsurface strata, along
the lines of Dean Wigmore’s subterranean appurtenance. Invasions of the
subsurface interest are, consequently, nontrespassory. They are nuisances.
IV. COURTS’ NONTRESPASSORY TREATMENT OF
INVASIONS OF SUBSURFACE PROPERTY INTERESTS
Courts have been hesitant to consider the possessory or nonpossessory
nature of a property interest in subsurface land.169 Regardless whether or
not a fee interest in surface property entitles the owner to a possessory
interest in the subjacent rock and pore space, a review of subsurface
invasion cases reveals that courts resolve unauthorized intrusions into
these things as nontrespassory invasions. Despite calling them subsurface
“trespasses,” courts treat these intrusions as implicating only use—and
not possession—of the rock or pore space.170 The clearest indication that
courts are concerned with use, as opposed to possession, is their
166. Id. §§ 101–102, 104. Professor Louise A. Halper notes a similar type of property interest that
developed as the need to protect owners of property adjacent to the then-newly constructed elevated
railway in New York City became acute. According to Halper, courts expanded their recognition of
property interests to include an “interest [appurtenant to land] in being free from injury . . . in the form
of a limited easement; limited in that the [owner] could do nothing with the easement except market
it.” Halper, supra note 144, at 344.
167. Incorporeal Hereditament, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
168. See supra section I.A.
169. E.g., Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. 862, 867 (Wyo. 1927) (“We have already stated that there
was a technical violation of the rights of the plaintiff. We need not determine what sort of an estate
plaintiffs had in the land.”).
170. Professors Keeton and Jones seem to have identified this phenomenon among Texas’s preGarza hydraulic fracturing cases. See Keeton & Jones, supra note 71, at 267 (“The invasions in these
cases are both direct and intentional, and unless it can be said that there is no interference with
possession either because of some distinction between surface and subsurface invasions or because
the water and the sand particles in solution do not constitute the type of ‘thing’ that is sufficient to
constitute a legal interference with possession, there would seem to be a technical trespass and a use
of another’s property. Technically, it is not the fracturing of the formation that would constitute the
trespass but rather the intrusion into the formation of the sand and water.”).
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application of legal standards and remedies associated with nuisance, as
opposed to trespass.171 Courts generally impose a liability rule that entitles
the affected owner to damages but no injunction. This holds across
jurisdictions and types of conduct, including waste disposal, enhanced oil
recovery, natural gas storage, directional drilling, and hydraulic
fracturing. The remainder of this section surveys cases arising in each
context to illustrate that a consensus of courts analyzes subsurface
intrusions as nontrespassory nuisances. The final section discusses how a
nuisance analysis could apply to resolve subsurface interferences arising
from CCS and other emerging technologies.
A.

Waste Disposal Cases

The primary waste associated with oil and gas production by volume is
produced water. Produced water is the brine originally trapped in
reservoirs that is brought to the surface in oil and gas extraction.172 Best
practice in modern oil and gas production is to dispose of produced water
by injection into geologic reservoirs. Saltwater disposal wells are
permitted under the federal Underground Injection Control (UIC)
program,173 as are several other classes of injection wells, including those
for hazardous and nonhazardous fluid wastes.174 To obtain administrative
injection authority under the UIC program, operators must have the
consent of the owner of the surface interest in the tract where the well is
to be located. UIC wells are thus typically permitted on relatively small
tracts of land in comparison with the subsurface area in which the injected
fluids migrate over time.
Disputes arise when fluid injected in a UIC well crosses the boundaries
of the tract where the well is permitted and into the subsurface pore space
of neighboring owners without their consent. The key question in these
cases tends to be “whether the owner has a right of recovery on a trespass
theory for the unauthorized invasion and use of the space underneath the

171. “Trespass” as used here refers to traditional trespass quare clausum fregit. It should be noted
that courts appear to treat claims for subsurface invasions as claims for trespass on the case. This
explains the requirement most courts impose on plaintiffs to show actual injury to use or enjoyment
of the property and the infrequency of injunctive relief.
172. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 863 F.2d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1988)
(describing produced water).
173. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (Supp. 2012). Subject to federal oversight, the UIC program is
primarily administered by individual states. Id. § 300h.
174. These are Class I wells, which inject hazardous and nonhazardous wastes; Class II wells,
which inject produced water; Class III wells, which inject fluids to dissolve and extract minerals;
Class IV wells, which inject hazardous or radioactive waste in shallow geologic reservoirs; Class V
wells, which inject nonhazardous waste into shallow geologic reservoirs; and Class VI wells, which
inject CO2 for geologic sequestration. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (2019).
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surface,” even if no physical damage or interference with the owner’s use
or enjoyment of the property occurred as a result.175 The issue arises
because, given the complexity of predicting where injected fluid could
migrate, it is unlikely any lessee would ever attempt to get the consent of
all owners whose land the fluid might migrate.176 This is also the principal
question surrounding liability for migration of sequestered CO2.
As will be seen in the following review of cases, an owner generally
does not have a right to recovery on a true trespass theory for the
unauthorized invasion and use of the space under her surface property.
Although courts label such claims as “trespasses,” they tend to eschew
applying any of the rules or remedies traditionally associated with
trespass. Instead, they require a showing of actual harm in addition to the
fact of the unauthorized invasion and deny ejectment and nominal
damages as remedies. Moreover, courts frequently reference the social
value of the injector’s activity and weigh it against the severity of the harm
sustained by the plaintiff. Such departures from the traditional tort render
these decisions unrecognizable as trespass cases. Rather, the typical
analysis in fluid injection cases closely resembles the tort of nuisance.
Reviewing these cases, it is clear that the strict, possession-protecting
provisions of trespass are inapplicable to property interests in the
subsurface, but that the flexible, use-accommodating precepts of nuisance
are appropriate.
In FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Texas Natural Resources Conservation
Commission,177 for example, the Texas Court of Appeals required a
showing of actual harm to establish liability for “trespass” from the
unauthorized invasion of injected wastewater. FPL Farming, Ltd. (FPL
Farming) appealed the commission’s order granting two injection well
permits allowing Environmental Processing Systems, L.P. (EPS) to inject
nonhazardous wastewater into a deep subsurface saltwater formation.178 It
was projected that the injected wastewater would enter under neighboring
land owned by FPL Farming within ten years of initial injection.179 FPL
Farming challenged the injection permits, contending that granting the
permits exceeded the commission’s statutory authority and constituted an
unconstitutional taking of FPL Farming’s property without compensation.
“Assuming without deciding that FPL Farming has ‘existing rights’ in
the deep subsurface beneath its land,” the court affirmed the commission’s

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Keeton & Jones, supra note 71, at 268.
Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 272 n.7 (E.D. La. 1988).
No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2003).
Id.
Id.

13 Schremmer.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

GETTING PAST POSSESSION

4/28/20 6:44 PM

345

finding that the injection would not impair any existing legal rights.180 The
court elaborated, “In essence, FPL Farming argues that migration [of
wastewater] alone will impair FPL Farming’s existing rights. We
disagree, concluding . . . that some measurement of harm must
accompany the migration for there to be impairment.”181 In so holding,
the court noted the commission’s position that “property owners do not
have the right to exclude deep subsurface migration of fluids.”182
FPL Farming also lost on its claim that the permits effected a physical
taking by allowing the wastewater plume to occupy its subsurface. A
physical taking occurs when the government authorizes a “physical
occupation” of property. Under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,183 a physical occupation occurs when the government action
“destroys three rights associated with the ownership of property: the
power to possess, use, and dispose.”184 The FPL Farming Court was
unpersuaded by FPL’s argument that it “lost its right to possess the
subsurface because the amended permits hamper its right to exclude
EPS’s waste plume, which is projected to migrate onto its property within
the next ten years.”185 FPL’s Loretto claim failed accordingly because it
lacked possessory rights in the subsurface.186
Likewise, in Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,187 the Ohio Supreme Court
defined the surface owner plaintiffs’ pore space rights to include only “the
right to exclude invasions of the subsurface property that actually interfere
with [their] reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface.”188 In
Chance, several landowners sued BP Chemicals for damages allegedly
caused by lateral migration of hazardous byproducts injected at BP’s
nearby chemical refinery.189 The plaintiffs asserted several common law
claims; the only issue that received significant discussion on appeal,
however, was whether the trial court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show
“some type of physical damages or interference with use” to establish a
180. Id. at *3.
181. Id. at *4.
182. Id. at *3.
183. 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
184. FPL Farming, 2003 WL 247183, at *5 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).
185. Id.
186. The result in FPL Farming is especially notable when viewed in light of the facts of Loretto
itself. There the Court held that placement of small television cable on Loretto’s five-story apartment
building constituted a physical occupation of the plaintiff’s property and an unconstitutional taking,
noting, “the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control
the use of the property . . . .” Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
187. 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996).
188. Id. at 992 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 990.
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trespass.190 The plaintiffs argued that any unauthorized invasion of their
subsurface would constitute trespass irrespective of actual interference
with preexisting use because common law trespass presumes damage.191
Affirming the trial court, the Ohio Supreme Court found the incursion
of hazardous waste did not violate the plaintiffs’ interest in the subsurface.
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ right to possess the subsurface is
limited in the same way a landowner’s right to possess the sky is limited
under Causby, for instance, only to the extent of the owner’s existing or
foreseeable use.192 Applying Chance in a gas storage case, the Northern
District of Ohio in Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC193 put a
finer point on the rule in this way:
If a landowner’s right to exclude a subsurface invader is limited
to those portions of the subsurface the landowner actually uses or
foreseeably may use, then Chance should also stand for the
converse proposition that one has no right to exclude a subsurface
‘invader’ from portions of the subsurface that one does not use.194
The Sixth Circuit’s subsequent opinion affirming Baatz refined the rule
once more: “[T]he Landowners do not have a ‘reasonable and foreseeable
use’ of their subsurface. As such, the Landowners do not have a present
possessory interest in their subsurface . . . .”195
A recent Texas Court of Appeals Case, Swift Energy Operating, LLC
v. Regency Field Services, LLC,196 demonstrates that Texas courts view
subsurface invasions as actionable only when they interfere with an
owner’s use and enjoyment. Swift sued Regency for trespass when
Regency’s injected waste gas migrated under Swift’s lease. The parties
disputed on what date the two-year limitations period accrued on Swift’s
trespass claim.197 Regency asserted on summary judgment that Swift’s
trespass claims accrued when the injectate entered Swift’s leases. Swift
countered that no cause of action accrued “merely because of the
uninvited intrusion of injectate into the subsurface space covered by”
Swift’s leases,198 and argued instead that any claim arose only when the

190. Id. at 993.
191. Id. at 993.
192. Id. at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vill. of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan,
278 N.E.2d 658, 665 (Ohio 1972)).
193. 295 F. Supp. 3d 776 (N.D. Ohio 2018), aff’d, 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019).
194. Id. at 785.
195. Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 929 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 2019).
196. No. 04-17-00638-CV, 2019 WL 1547608 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2019).
197. Id. at *3–4.
198. Id. at *3 (Swift cited Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex.
2017), discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 280–292).
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injectate “actually infringe[d] on [Swift’s] mineral rights.”199 The
appellate panel sided with Swift finding the cause of action accrued only
because “the injected plume overlaid Swift’s leased depths and would
require Swift to drill any new wells through the contamination, and the
injectate had reached Swift’s existing well bores and would corrode
them,” and thus affected Swift’s rights in the mineral lease.200 In other
words, the mere incursion of unauthorized substances did not implicate
Swift’s rights in the subsurface and therefore the incursion must have
been nontrespassory.
Similarly, in Raymond v. Union Texas Petroleum Corp.,201 the Eastern
District of Louisiana found “no legally actionable trespass” for migration
into the plaintiffs’ subsurface of saltwater injected on adjoining land.202
The plaintiffs sought damages for trespass measured by the rental value
of the pore space occupied by the wastewater. Although the claim failed
for other reasons, the court commented there would be no actionable
trespass even if the plaintiffs could prove the invading water was
unauthorized because they suffered no “injury or inconvenience” and
ownership rights are limited as necessary to prevent waste of
hydrocarbons and needless drilling.203

199. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 2019 WL 1547608 at *3.
200. Id. at *4.
201. 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1988).
202. Id. at 273.
203. Id. at 273–75 (citing Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986) and W.
Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1950)); see also Jefferson
Island Storage & Hub, LLC, 255 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (“If saltwater injected by Jefferson
Island did migrate beneath the Boudreaux plaintiffs’ property a mile underground, that fluid did
nothing more than displace existing saltwater and in no way affected the use or enjoyment of the
land.”). The Kansas Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in Crawford v. Hrabe, in which the
court wrote,
While our discussion of trespass cases is helpful, it is not conclusive. We turn to consideration
of the economics and practical usage of salt water disposal or other water in a secondary recovery
operation. . . . In the final analysis our decision must . . . be driven by the facts of this particular
case. The secondary recovery operations have increased production. This increase is beneficial
to all parties. Off-lease salt water is economically available. To drill a supply well on the Hrabe
property would increase expenses of lease operations. 44 P.3d 442, 452 (Kan. 2002). Texas
courts do not, as the Crawford Court did, conflate the social value of saltwater disposal with the
value of injection for enhanced oil recovery. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that
injecting substances to aid in the extraction of minerals serves a different purpose than does
injecting wastewater. We have recognized that ‘[i]t cannot be disputed that [secondary
operations to recover oil and gas] should be encouraged’ to ‘increase the ultimate recovery of oil
and gas’ . . . . Manziel and Garza considered the justification for the rule of capture—greater oil
and gas recovery—in their analyses. However, the rule of capture is not applicable to wastewater
injection. Mineral owners can protect their interests from drainage through means such as
pooling or drilling their own wells. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.
3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
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The courts in the above cases did not award damages for fluid
invasions. When they do award damages for fluid migration courts tend
to be unclear about the doctrinal basis for the award. In Cassinos v. Union
Oil Co. of California,204 for example, the California Court of Appeals
affirmed an award of damages to a mineral interest owner based on the oil
and gas lessee’s injection of off-lease produced water.205 The lessee
injected the water into a well on the mineral owner’s lease with the
permission of the surface interest owner and the injection interfered with
existing oil production from the lease. The court noted that in California
the mineral estate is nonpossessory and mineral owners enjoy merely an
exclusive right to take minerals in place, otherwise classified as a profità-prendre. Purporting to apply this doctrine, Cassinos affirmed the trial
court’s award of damages and held that the injection constituted a
“permanent trespass” of the mineral owner’s nonpossessory interest.206
Cassinos’s reasoning illustrates a pervasive problem in subsurface
invasion cases. Even though the classification of a mineral estate in
California (a nonpossessory profit-à-prendre) does not include possession
rights, Cassinos held that interference with a mineral interest owner’s
ability to produce minerals constitutes a permanent trespass. This cannot
be correct doctrinally unless “trespass” means trespass on the case. On the
contrary, the property interest affected by the defendant’s injection in
Cassinos must have been the mineral owner’s right to access and produce,
i.e. use, the minerals. Infringement of the right to use interests in real
property is a nuisance.
The error in Cassinos is not merely a labelling mistake. Labeling
conduct a “trespass” incorporates a particular legal rule of liability and
particular remedies that meaningfully differ from the legal standard and
remedies that apply when conduct is labeled a “nuisance.” When courts
like Cassinos label subsurface invasions “trespasses,” they often find that
the rules and remedies for trespasses do not fit the circumstances or
achieve desirable results. Courts then modify the rules of trespass to
provide flexibility to accommodate the competing interests. As FPL
Farming, Chance, and Cassinos illustrate, modifications include:
(a) requiring proof of actual damages; (b) eliminating nominal damages
and ejectment as remedies; and (c) weighing the plaintiff’s injuries against
the economic or social value of the defendant’s injection to determine
liability. Each of these modifications tend to morph the tort into nuisance,
which, based on the nature of the property interest truly implicated,
provides the appropriate analytical framework.
204. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 582, 584.
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Oklahoma courts do apply a “modified” private nuisance doctrine to
resolve subsurface invasions by injected fluid.207 Oklahoma’s modified
nuisance doctrine “is essentially the common law doctrine as altered by a
provision in the Oklahoma Constitution which the Oklahoma courts have
said removes the common law elements of carelessness or
unreasonableness.”208 Thus where a nuisance is found strict liability
attaches. In determining whether conduct constitutes a nuisance,
Oklahoma courts apply a reasonableness rule under which “a person may
use his property in any lawful manner, except that he must not use it so as
to injure or damage his neighbor.”209 It is not clear what standards
Oklahoma courts apply to determine the reasonableness of a given use. It
can be observed, however, that no liability attaches in cases where only
saltwater invades the plaintiff’s land and the plaintiff can show no actual
damages beyond the fact of the invasion. The opinions justify this result
based on the importance of wastewater disposal to the industry
and society.210
Where an invasion causes actual damage, Oklahoma courts award
compensation regardless of any justification for the invasion. Courts have
interpreted Oklahoma’s constitution to contain a strict liability provision
protecting a landowner against any losses “in the nature of real and
substantial injury to his property, resulting from the use of adjacent or
nearby property by its owner.”211 In West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v.
Lillard,212 for example, the plaintiff showed that injected saltwater from
the defendant’s operations precluded the plaintiff from producing and
pulling the casing from a well on his property. Lillard awarded
compensatory damages without considering reasonableness or social
utility of the defendant’s conduct. The court also did not consider whether
the expense of paying compensation might render the defendant’s
injection operations infeasible.
These fluid disposal cases illustrate that courts conceive of subsurface
property rights merely as use rights that do not entitle the owner to
exclusively claim any portion of subsurface strata it is not presently, or
foreseeably will be, using. The plaintiffs in FPL Farming, Chance, and
Raymond did not show any injury to existing or foreseeable uses of the
property and consequently were held not to have an actionable claim
based on the invasion of their subsurface. The plaintiffs in Cassinos and
207. Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439, 441 (10th Cir. 1971).
208. Id.
209. W. Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 973 (Okla. 1950).
210. See, e.g., id. at 969–71 (noting that if saltwater disposal requires the consent of all persons
under whose land the water might migrate it would be practically prohibited).
211. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23; Fairfax Oil Corp. v. Bolinger, 97 P.2d 574, 575 (Okla. 1939).
212. 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).
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Lillard, in contrast, proved the migration of injected fluids diminished
their ability to produce oil and gas from existing wells. Those plaintiffs
were judged to have a claim for damages. It appears that the rule
developing in fluid injection disputes is that landowners are not entitled
to exclude third-party injectors from using their subsurface to store
injected waste, but injectors are strictly liable for any actual damages
caused by the injection. The rule imposes liability where the complaining
owner can show an interference with its use rights. This would not be the
expected trend if the surface estate’s interest in underlying pore space
were possessory.
This trespass-based strict liability approach potentially entails two
broad problems that could be tempered or avoided by applying common
law nuisance. First, the rule does not contain criteria for determining when
the injector’s conduct is sufficiently important to privilege any resulting
invasion. In other words, it is not clear when resulting damages constitute
legally actionable injury; or, in the jargon of the early common lawyers,
when damnum is injuria.213 Nuisance law, in contrast, furnishes rules for
determining when resulting damages are wrongful and constitute legal
injury. As an example, the Restatement (Second)’s version of nuisance
distinguishes mere damages from legal injury by comparing the utility of
the offending conduct with the gravity of the resulting harm. Under this
version of nuisance, injection activities are privileged, and resulting harm
is damnum absque injuria, if the injection is more socially valuable than
the harm to the affected subsurface owner is severe. Nuisance is thus
capable of distinguishing between harms a subsurface owner must suffer
without compensation and those which must be compensated.
Second, strict liability may prohibit capital-intensive socially valuable
waste storage activities such as CCS.214 The subsurface trespass rule
places the costs of an injector’s conduct with the injector regardless of
whether the injector is best able to bear the costs (i.e., is the least-cost
avoider among the parties) or whether the costs may be so great as to
render the socially valuable conduct infeasible. Under such an approach a
prospective CO2 injector, for example, would not only be potentially
liable for all damages caused by its injection, but would also lack a well213. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 449, 9th ed. 2009 (defining “damnum” as “a loss;
damage suffered”), with id. at 856 (defining “injuria” as a legal wrong). See Halper, supra note 144,
at 311 & n.43 (“Bracton said, as an illustration of the difference between damnum and injuria, that
one who ‘erects a mill on his own land and takes from his neighbor his own suit and that of
others; . . . does his neighbor damage but no injuria since he is not prohibited by law or a constitution
from having or erecting a mill.’” (quoting 3 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE
164 (S. Thorne ed. 1977)).
214. It has been noted that strict liability regimes tend to induce actors to regulate the frequency of
activity as well as the level of care in conducting the activity. See STEVEN SHAVELL, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21–32 (1987) (describing the incentive effects of strict
liability regimes).
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defined legal standard for determining liability. It should be further noted
that while the rental or use value of pore space for waste storage has been
considered de minimis, the advent of commercial CCS (particularly with
potentially lucrative tax incentives) may help establish an economic value
for this right in certain areas. Consequently, precedent holding that use of
another’s pore space for fluid disposal is not compensable as actual
damages may need to be rethought. As the value increases, courts
employing a strict liability standard may find it necessary to compensate
nonconsenting owners even if it would render the storage
project infeasible.
Additionally, nuisance law provides courts flexibility in tailoring
remedies for subsurface invasions. The main remedies available under
nuisance encompass compensatory and punitive damages, injunction
abating the nuisance, and (rarely) a “compensated injunction” that abates
the nuisance but requires the plaintiff to pay the costs of abatement.215
Courts also have the discretion to limit or refuse injunctions in private
nuisance cases if the defendant is carrying on an activity that is so socially
or economically important the injunction would do more harm than
good.216 A great deal of study has been done on the efficiencies available
through various nuisance remedies and combinations of remedies. There
is a deep literature for litigants and courts to draw from to maximize utility
and efficiency in nuisance cases.217 Though a discussion of the most
efficient remedies for subsurface nuisances exceeds the scope of this
Article, it is reasonably clear that the variety of alternatives would
improve on the rule of strict liability imposed by trespass.
Nuisance remedies also address Professor Anderson’s concern that
nonconsenting owners should be compensated for serious damage from
invasions. Under the compensation principle, even if the injector’s
conduct is reasonable, both the unauthorized use of the pore space and any
special losses, like damage to producing wells, would be compensable if
so severe the plaintiff should not be required to bear them without
compensation. This approach would achieve the result desired by the
subsurface trespass theory (compensation for damages when fairness
requires) without imposing absolute liability on socially
beneficial conduct.
It should be noted that a strict-liability approach has (at least) one
advantage over utility-balancing: it more clearly specifies property rights,

215. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 404.
216. Id.
217. See id. See generally, e.g., Lewin, supra note 111, at 236–80 (surveying law and economics
literature of nuisance).
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which often improves bargaining efficiency between rights holders.218 For
instance, under Professor Anderson’s subsurface trespass theory,219
subsurface owners clearly have the right to inject fluid into common
reservoirs even if it migrates into a neighbor’s portion of the reservoir, but
clearly do not have the right to cause any damage to the neighbor as a
result. Ideally, given the clarity of these entitlements, a subsurface owner
that wanted to inject fluid into a common reservoir could purchase from
neighboring owners their right to receive damages and thus avoid disputes
before they happen.
The physical reality of subsurface reservoirs, however, means there are
many neighbors to bargain with. The presence of multiple players
increases transaction costs and the possibility that one will hold out.
Moreover, because reservoirs have unique physical characteristics, if
bargaining fails or would be prohibitively expensive, the would-be
injector may not be able to simply pick up and move to a different one. In
the case of resources like interconnected reservoirs, which are depleting
resources owned in common among potentially numerous rights holders,
the costs of bargaining are high and undermine the simplifying effect of
allocating rights in a strict liability regime.220 The common law
traditionally responded to conditions of high transaction costs with more
flexible and discretionary doctrines, like nuisance.221
B.

Enhanced Recovery Cases

When initial or “primary” production222 of oil and gas from a reservoir
ceases, and natural pressures no longer drive reservoir fluids into
wellbores for production, it becomes necessary to reenergize the reservoir
artificially through “enhanced recovery.”223 Enhanced recovery involves
injecting into the depleted reservoir water, chemicals, heat, or CO2.224
218. See Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 13, 19 (1985) (analyzing property law responses to situations involving higher and
lower transaction costs). For the classic articulation of the role of definition of property rights in
transaction costs, see generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. J. (1960).
219. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing Anderson’s work). While Anderson’s theory clearly
specifies entitlements to use another’s portion of the reservoir when the use is societally desirable, it
does not specify what uses fit this category. This element of the theory may undermine its ability
ultimately to define subsurface rights clearly.
220. For a discussion of bargaining and transactions costs in common property, see Carol M. Rose,
Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261,
282–85 (1990).
221. Merrill, supra note 218, at 19.
222. LOWE, supra note 1, at 47.
223. Id. at 311–12.
224. Id. at 886–87. Injection of produced water to stimulate production is often termed “secondary
recovery” or specifically “waterflooding.” Id.
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Enhanced recovery projects usually occur on lands within an oil or gas
conservation unit formed by the authority of an administrative agency.
Units ideally encompass significant areas of land embracing the full extent
of the producing reservoir. Disputes nonetheless arise when injected fluids
cross unit boundaries and cause valuable minerals to migrate into the unit
from lands outside of the unit.
The legal rule governing such disputes is known as the “negative rule
of capture.” The negative rule of capture permits unit operators to “inject
into a formation substances which may migrate through the structure to
the land of others, even if this results in the displacement under such land
of more valuable with less valuable substances.”225 Courts applying the
rule justify this result by the social importance of enhanced recovery for
the prevention of waste of hydrocarbon resources and waste from more
wells than are necessary to efficiently deplete a reservoir. These cases tend
to focus on drainage of hydrocarbons from a nonconsenting owner’s
property rather than unauthorized use of the owner’s pore space.226 As
with the fluid disposal cases, above, these cases illustrate courts’ tendency
to call an invasion a trespass while analyzing it like a nuisance.
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel227 is one such case. There an
unleased landowner sued to set aside a commission order permitting water
injection for secondary recovery. The landowner asserted that
encroachment of the injected water into his subsurface would constitute a
trespass. In holding that the unleased owner may not enjoin any water
encroachment, the Manziel Court expended significant space in its
opinion extolling the social value of secondary recovery operations. It
opined, “[i]t is obvious that secondary recovery programs could not and
would not be conducted if any adjoining operator [or landowner] could
stop the project on the ground of subsurface trespass.”228 Balancing this
consideration with the plaintiff’s property rights, Manziel ultimately held
that the “rules of ownership are of prime importance, but in this
consideration the rights of one [the nonconsenting landowner] do not
exceed the rights of another [the injector].”229 Other courts follow a
225. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Tex. 1962) (quoting HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 204.5, at 60.2 (1959)). The negative rule of
capture is widely followed. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW §
204.5 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 2018) (collecting cases from numerous
jurisdictions applying the rule).
226. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12, at 272–73.
227. 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
228. Id. at 568.
229. Id. at 572. The Texas Supreme Court in Garza appeared to treat Manziel as authority that no
trespass whatsoever occurs if water injected pursuant to a Commission-approved secondary recovery
unit migrates and drains minerals from lands outside the unit. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008). It does not appear, however, that Manziel is precedential
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similar approach and generally find that the public value of enhanced
recovery
justifies
any
drainage
of
minerals
from
230
nonconsenting landowners.
Courts occasionally award compensatory damages in enhanced
recovery cases. In Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson,231 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals permitted plaintiff operators to recover damages to an oil well
caused by the defendant’s adjoining waterflood.232 The plaintiffs alleged
the defendant “had injected water at unreasonable and excessive rates in
wells located along the boundaries” of a lease adjoining plaintiffs’ lease
“‘and that such injections at such high rates were unreasonable, since the
injection wells were deliberately located as close as possible to the
property line and immediately opposite and within less than 100 feet of
two of the plaintiffs’ wells.’”233
The court framed the issue on appeal as “by what standards of tort
liability shall the [defendant’s] conduct be judged, i.e., trespass, nuisance,
negligence, strict liability, or unreasonable use or disregard of another’s
property.”234 The Tenth Circuit, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, searched
Kansas law and found no applicable standard of tort liability for water
flooding operations. The most apposite case was Polzin v. National
Cooperative Refinery Association235 in which the Kansas Supreme Court
held that proof of negligence was not essential to establish a statutory
cause of action for underground releases of saltwater.236 The Jackson
Court noted that Oklahoma courts follow a similar approach and that
Texas rejects absolute liability in favor of a negligence standard.
Eventually Jackson applied what appears to be a nuisance-like
standard, even referencing sections of the Restatement of Torts pertaining
to nuisance.237 Citing Professors Keeton and Jones the court explained:
[t]hey suggest that orthodox rules and principles applicable to
surface invasions should not be appropriately applied to
on that point. Three years after Garza, the Texas Supreme Court, in FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl.
Processing Sys., L.C., explained that it held in Manziel that “that Railroad Commission authorization
of secondary recovery projects are not subject to injunctive relief based on trespass claims.” 351
S.W.3d 306, 313 (Tex. 2011) (emphasis added).
230. See, e.g., Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, Syl. ¶ 5 (Kan. 2002) (“To establish a rule which
prevents importation of water for secondary oil and gas recovery, yet requires additional wells to be
drilled on the lessor’s premises to produce water for the same purpose, would appear to undermine
conservation, promote waste, and foster uneconomic actions.”).
231. 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963), abrogated by Fransen v. Conoco, Inc., 64 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1995).
232. Id. at 165.
233. Id. at 163.
234. Id. at 162.
235. 266 P.2d 293 (Kan. 1954).
236. Tidewater Oil Co., 320 F.2d at 162–63 (citing Polzin, 266 P.2d at 297–98).
237. Id. at 162–63 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826–32 & 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)).
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subsurface invasions, arising out of operations affected with a
public interest and involving a weighing of the individual interest
of the damaged lessee against the social interest involved in the
production and conservation of crude oil.238
Jackson ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim “is based upon
intentional and unreasonable interference with the claimants’ property
rights, resulting in actual and substantial damages,” and affirmed the trial
court’s award of lost profits damages for prematurely watering out
plaintiffs’ wells.239
Jackson’s analysis is more concerned with the reasonableness of the
water flooder’s conduct than the type of injury to the plaintiffs’ property
interest. The latter question is essential in determining liability for
subsurface interferences. By applying a nuisance-like standard, however,
Jackson implicitly acknowledges that encroaching water infringes an
owner’s subsurface property rights only if the conduct causing the
encroachment unreasonably interferes with the owner’s ability to
reasonably use the subsurface—which in Jackson meant the owner’s
ability to produce its existing wells. Relevant considerations in making
this determination would include the appropriateness of the conduct to the
locality, the actor’s ability to avoid the harm, and the utility of the actor’s
conduct. These are factors in a nuisance analysis under the
Second Restatement.
Manziel and Jackson demonstrate the broad trend in enhanced recovery
cases to privilege physical invasions of property where a strong public
policy reason exists for the conduct causing the invasion. Jackson
illustrates that damages may nonetheless be available for injuries caused
by excessive or unreasonable injection operations even if conducted
pursuant to a regulatory permit. Few clear standards have emerged in
these cases and many questions persist: How are courts to weigh the
relative utility of a given enhanced recovery operation in comparison with
other subsurface activities competing for primacy in a common reservoir?
How are they to decide when the operations are conducted in an
unreasonable manner? Express application of nuisance doctrine would
guide courts in each of these questions and refine the analysis in
these cases.
C.

Natural Gas Storage Cases

Produced natural gas is frequently injected into subsurface strata for
temporary storage until winter months when demand for the product is
238. Id. at 163 (citing Keeton & Jones, supra note 71).
239. Id. at 163–64.
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high.240 Natural gas storage rights are usually acquired by eminent domain
under the Natural Gas Act.241 Under the act a storage facility must acquire
through contract or condemnation the exclusive right to use pore space for
gas storage.242 Disputes arise in condemnation cases over valuation of the
strata and pore space to be used for gas storage. In most cases, however,
it is the condemnation of the exclusive right to exploit the substances
native to the pore space in the condemned area, and not the value of the
strata and pore space itself, that drives the valuation question.243
Claims of trespass occur when injected gas migrates from a certificated
storage field into the subsurface strata of offsetting owners.244 Because
natural gas storage rights are typically obtained through use or threat of
condemnation, courts tend to treat claims of trespass arising from the
migration of injected natural gas from a storage facility as actions in
inverse condemnation.245 Moreover, because gas has a market value, most
of the natural gas storage cases focus on ownership of the stored gas rather
than the invasion that occurs when injected gas strays from the confines
of the storage facility.246
Courts generally do not award compensation for unauthorized use of
pore space for gas storage absent a showing of interference with use of
the property. Although widely criticized, some courts follow Hammonds
v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,247 which held that escaped natural
gas from a storage facility did not trespass on the plaintiff’s subsurface
because the gas storage company had abandoned the gas when it
escaped.248 Other jurisdictions have rejected Hammonds’s reasoning in
240. ANR Pipeline Co. v. 60 Acres of Land, 418 F. Supp. 2d 933, 937 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (Supp. 2012). The act permits private natural gas companies to obtain
certificates of public convenience empowering them to condemn private property for constructing
underground natural gas storage facilities. Id.
242. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 725.
243. Id. at 724 (“[D]isputes may arise over the valuation of the storage space, but it is well settled
that compensation must be paid when the exclusive right to protect the storage strata by condemning
all other exploitation of the strata and its contents is acquired by the natural gas company.”).
244. Id. at 724–25.
245. Id. at 730.
246. Id.
247. 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934). Hammonds analogized stored natural gas to captured wild animals
to hold that “if in fact the gas turned loose in the earth wandered into the plaintiff’s land, the defendant
is not liable to her for the value of the use of her property, for the company ceased to be the exclusive
owner of the whole of the gas—it again became mineral faere naturae” and again subject to capture.
Id. at 206.
248. For example, the Hammonds doctrine applies in Kansas when a person uses the subsurface of
another to store natural gas without authority or compensation and no natural gas public utility is
involved and no certificate authorizing a natural gas storage facility has been issued. Anderson v.
Beech Aircraft Corp. 699 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1985). Notably, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
applied Hammonds-like logic in West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, a case
involving disposal of produced water, where it held there was no liability for migration of injected
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favor of finding that escaped storage gas remains the property of the
storage company. But few cases in non-Hammond jurisdictions have
squarely addressed whether the escape of storage gas into a nonconsenting
owner’s pore space constitutes a trespass or a taking.249
Rejecting Hammonds a Michigan federal court stated in ANR Pipeline
Co. v. 60 Acres of Land250 that “if injected gas moves across boundaries
there may be a trespass,” and if the intrusion was caused by a gas storage
company with condemnation authority the invasion may furnish a basis
for a claim of inverse condemnation.251 The court, however, distinguished
intrusions of native “cushion” gas, which is displaced from the storage
facility by injection of storage gas, because it is not foreign to the
reservoir.252 The court held that no compensation is due for use of pore
space to store cushion gas unless the claimant can show some harm, such
as interference with use of the property.253
ANR Pipeline did not analyze whether use of another’s pore space
without permission to store natural gas would constitute an actionable
trespass. The case nonetheless illustrates courts’ reluctance to consider the
underground movement of fluids to be physical intrusions and their
tendency to award compensation only where the plaintiff proves
impairment of use. The only compensable injury a subsurface owner
suffers by the condemnation of reservoir space for gas storage or intrusion
by injected or displaced gas is an interference with use of the property.
There is no compensable injury for loss of possession.
This point was made explicitly by the Sixth Circuit in Baatz v.
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC.254 Following Chance v. BP Chemicals,
Inc.,255 Baatz denied landowners’ claims of trespass and unjust
enrichment against Columbia for storing natural gas under their land
without permission or a condemnation order.256 Absent a showing of
actual or foreseeable use of the subsurface, Baatz held, the landowners

saltwater, in part because “[u]nder all the authorities we have been able to find upon the subject, the
assumption that the salt water remained the property of defendants after it permeated or penetrated
into the . . . formation underlying the land of plaintiffs is incorrect.” 226 P.2d 965, 970 (Okla. 1950).
249. See generally Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 723–33 (surveying natural gas storage
cases touching on trespass issues).
250. 418 F. Supp. 2d 933 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
251. Id. at 940.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 941.
254. 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019).
255. See supra section IV.A.
256. Baatz, 929 F.3d at 773, 777.
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could not establish that the gas storage violated a possessory interest or
entitled them to restitution.257
D.

Tunneling and Directional Drilling Cases

This section discusses cases involving various forms of tunneling under
nonconsenting owners’ land. For present purposes “tunneling” includes
drilling oil or gas wells. The tunneling cases discussed below indicate
courts are unwilling to compensate a landowner for the mere presence of
an unauthorized tunnel or wellbore. Claimants must show interference
with use or enjoyment of the surface or minerals in the property to justify
relief. Since courts in these cases already treat them as nontrespassory in
nature, applying a nuisance analysis would rationalize the results and
furnish a reasoned approach to determining when a plaintiff’s lost use
value justifies compensation.
1.

Tunnels Not for Oil and Gas Purposes

Early cases reached mixed results on whether tunneling beneath private
property without permission violates the owner’s subsurface rights. While
some courts appeared to consider subsurface property as fully possessory
as surface property, others, like New York courts, did not. In Boehringer
v. Montalto258 the New York Supreme Court explained that “the title of
an owner of the soil will not be extended to a depth below ground beyond
which the owner may not reasonably make use thereof,” and concluded
that a proposed 150-foot deep sewer was beyond this point.259 Likewise,
in In re Tunnel Street in New York, the court held,
[t]he effect of the improvement contemplated in this proceeding
is to take a tunnel through appellants’ property 150 feet below the
surface. It will not restrict the superficial area of the property[,]
or in any way interfere with its improvement or development.
Save for the bore taken for the tunnel[,] the appellants will own
their property as absolutely as they now own it. . . . The
appellants’ claim for damage . . . impresses us as unsubstantial
and fanciful, with no sound basis to rest upon.260

257. Id. at 777. For a case affirming an award of damages for trespass and unjust enrichment on
similar facts, see Beck v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Kansas law).
258. 254 N.Y.S. 276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931).
259. Id. at 278; see also In re Gillespie, 17 N.Y.S.2d 560, 563–64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (regarding
a tunnel buried 470 to 500 feet deep).
260. 144 N.Y.S. 1002, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913), aff’d, 106 N.E. 1043 (N.Y. 1914).
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Compare the New York tunneling cases with Smith v. City of Atlanta,261
where the Georgia Supreme Court applied the ad coelum doctrine to the
subsurface.262 Smith found the city’s tunneling under the plaintiff’s lot did
not affect the lot’s market value but nonetheless held it constituted a
taking of the plaintiff’s property.263 In its brief reasoning Smith explains
that ad coelum applies “upwards as well as downwards” such that “[a]ll
the earth removed belonged to the plaintiffs, and unquestionably by the
location of the sewer they were deprived of the possession of space it
occupied, and could no longer use that space for any other purpose.”264
The plaintiff alleged loss of income from selling sand from the area where
the tunnel was dug. The court criticized the plaintiffs’ allegations as
“imperfectly drawn” but held that “a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for
some amount—certainly for at least nominal damages—was demanded
by the evidence.”265 The court ultimately reversed the lower court’s denial
of a new trial on the proper amount of compensation and remanded the
case for determination of the lost use value.
Similarly the city in City of Chicago v. Troy Laundry Machine
Company266 was held liable for trespass for digging a tunnel fifty-five feet
below the surface of property without the owner’s knowledge.267 When
the owner constructed a building on the property six years later, water
flowing through the city’s tunnel eroded the soil and caused the building
to sink. The court stated that both the tunnel’s original construction and
the water flowing through the tunnel constituted trespasses but noted the
building of the tunnel was “a mere historic incident in the case.”268 The
court ultimately upheld the plaintiff’s verdict for damages caused by the
erosion of the surface.
Early commentators grappled with the contrariety in these and other
early subsurface use cases. Certain decisions, including Smith and Troy
Laundry Machine, prompted one scholar to remark in 1927 that the
subsurface appears to be “something which can be owned, and is owned,
subject, of course, to the limitations imposed by our modes of life . . . .”269
This characterization did not account for the New York cases finding no
compensable property interest in the subsurface. Moreover, neither Smith
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

17 S.E. 981 (Ga. 1893).
Id.
Id. Sy. ¶ 1.
Id. at 981.
Id.
162 F. 678 (7th Cir. 1908).
Id.
Id. at 679. For other older cases finding trespass liability for subsurface invasions see the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1969).
269. Ball, supra note 68, at 689.
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nor Troy Laundry Machine holds that subsurface tunneling interferes with
the surface owner’s possessory right in the subsurface. Although Smith
appears to hold that the plaintiff was entitled at least to nominal damages
for the sewer tunnel under his property, the case was ultimately remanded
for a new trial on the value of the plaintiff’s surface uses impaired by the
tunneling. And although Troy Laundry Machine states the mere digging
of the tunnel was a trespass, this statement was not necessary to the
disposition of the case, which was decided based on the plaintiff’s lost use
value in the surface and building as a result of the tunnel.270
These cases show that early courts agreed surface ownership includes
a negative right to be free from subsurface interferences that inhibit use of
the surface.271 Subsurface tunneling is compensable when it violates the
surface owner’s negative right (as in Smith and Troy Laundry Machine)
and is not when it does not (as in the New York cases). Synthesizing the
cases this way leads to a conclusion, similar to Dean Wigmore’s, that the
subsurface is akin to an incorporeal appurtenance of the surface.
2.

Slant-Hole and Directional Wellbores

Drillers sometimes deviate or slant boreholes to produce minerals from
a portion of reservoir not directly beneath the surface location of the well.
Unscrupulous drillers do so with the intent of bottoming the producing
portion of a well under neighboring property to surreptitiously produce oil
or gas from their neighbor’s land.272 Affected subsurface owners typically
sue slant-hole drillers for two causes of action: trespass and conversion of
the oil or gas. As California Court of Appeals in Alphonzo E. Bell Corp.
v. Bell View Oil Syndicate273 explained in one such slant-hole trespass and
conversion case, “[w]e do not need to discuss the injury to the real estate,
as these actions are not based upon damages suffered to the real estate but
are based upon the wrongful conversion of oil, gas, and other
hydrocarbons from beneath the property.”274

270. City of Chi. v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 162 F. 678 (7th Cir. 1908).
271. Even the New York holdings leave room for a takings claim for underground tunneling if it
would interfere with the development of the surface. See In re Tunnel St. in N.Y., 144 N.Y.S. 1002,
1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913), aff’d, 106 N.E. 1043 (N.Y. 1914).
272. See generally Mortimer Kline, Subsurface Trespassing, 5 J. MARSHALL L.Q. 30 (1939)
(describing the problem as a matter of trespass and conversion); Note, Suing a Slant-Driller for
Subsurface Trespass or Drainage, 15 STAN. L. REV. 665, 680 (1963) (describing the issue and noting
that slant-hole invasions appear to be the earliest subsurface trespass cases arising in the oil and gas
industry).
273. 76 P.2d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
274. Id. at 175.
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Many slant-hole cases also involve requests for injunction. In Union
Oil of California v. Domengeaux,275 Union Oil sued to enjoin
Domengeaux from operating a deviated well located on the surface of
Domengeaux’s land but that had been completed under Union Oil’s
lease.276 Before Domengeaux commenced drilling, Union Oil warned him
not to “cause or permit said well to cross or be within the boundary lines
of” Union Oil’s lease.277 Domengeaux ignored the warning and drilled
the deviated well.
Union Oil sued for injunctive relief and damages but abandoned its
damages claim at trial because of the difficulty in proving where the
produced oil originated.278 The appellate court upheld an order enjoining
Domengeaux to plug back the well to a bottom-hole location within
Domengeaux’s lease boundaries even though Union Oil showed no actual
damages. “Before leaving the point,” however, the court stated,
we do not wish to be understood as holding that every subsurface
trespass in the drilling of an oil well would warrant injunctive
relief. We can conceive of an oil well deviating slightly from the
perpendicular, trespassing to a small extent upon the land of an
adjoining owner and returning to oil-producing strata within the
property of the owner of the well. In such case, the damage, if
any, to the adjoining owners might be said to be wholly
inconsequential
and
equitable
relief
might
be
properly withheld.279
As in the non-oil and gas tunneling cases, liability in slant-hole well cases
depends on the loss of the property’s available economic use—production
of valuable minerals—and not on the physical invasion of the plaintiff’s
subsurface by defendant’s wellbore. Subsurface intrusions by deviated
wellbores must not be trespassory invasions because they are not
actionable unless they also deprive the subsurface owner of the economic
value of underlying mineral reserves.
The nontrespassory nature of nonproducing wellbores is further
illustrated by the recent Texas Supreme Court case of Lightning Oil Co.
v. Anadarko E&P OnShore, LLC.280 Lightning Oil involved a dispute over
use of a common reservoir for oil and gas production between Lightning
and Anadarko. Lightning owned an oil and gas lease covering the Briscoe

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

86 P.2d 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.
Id.
520 S.W.3d 39, 49 (Tex. 2017).
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Ranch.281 Anadarko owned an oil and gas lease on adjoining property that
strictly limited use of the surface for drilling.282 Anadarko obtained the
permission of the surface owner of the Briscoe Ranch to drill horizontal
wellbores from a location on the Ranch to produce from its adjoining
leasehold.283 Anadarko did not intend to produce along any portion of the
wellbores under the Ranch.284 Lightning nevertheless objected to
Anadarko’s drilling anywhere under the Ranch and sued for trespass,
tortious interference, and injunction.285
The Texas Supreme Court declared the surface owner “owns all
nonmineral ‘molecules’ of the land, i.e., the mass that undergirds the
surface,”286 as well as the “reservoir [storage] space”287 under the surface.
It further stated that an oil and gas lessee owns the right to develop
associated with the severed mineral estate, which it described as “the
exclusive right to appropriate [the minerals],”288 but does not own the
“right to possess the specific place or space where the minerals are
located.”289 From these principles the court reasoned that “an
unauthorized interference with the place where the minerals are located
constitutes a trespass as to the mineral estate only if the interference
infringes on the mineral lessee’s ability to exercise its rights.”290 The court
ultimately held that Lightning failed to offer sufficient proof that
Anadarko’s proposed well sites, drilling activities, and underground well
structures would interfere with surface and subsurface spaces necessary
for Lightning to develop the minerals.291 The court further held that any
minerals lost as a result of Anadarko’s drilling through the subsurface
were outweighed by the interests of the public in maximizing recovery of
oil and gas.292
Contrast Lightning Oil with Chevron Oil Company v. Howell293 where
Chevron appealed from a temporary injunction restraining it from drilling
281. Id. at 43.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 46 (first quoting Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 480 S.W.3d 628,
633–35 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015), and then quoting Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park
Serv., 630 F.3d 431, 441 (5th Cir. 2011)).
287. Id. (first quoting Lightning Oil Co., 480 S.W.3d at 633–35, then quoting West, 480 S.W.3d at 815.
288. Id. at 47–48 (quoting Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 293–94 (Tex.
1923)).
289. Id. at 49.
290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 51.
293. 407 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).
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a directional well through a subsurface tract to access minerals it leased
under Lake Texoma.294 Chevron argued that its directional wellbore did
not interfere with the rights of the mineral lessee in the subsurface tract
and should not be enjoined. The court disagreed based on testimony of
Chevron’s superintendent that “any time you drill into something there is
bound to be some damage.”295
It is difficult to reconcile Lightning Oil with the slant-hole well cases
and Howell under a trespass analysis. Whereas in the slant-hole well cases
the loss of minerals resulting from an intruding wellbore is compensable,
the court in Lightning Oil declined to award Lightning damages for loss
of minerals. And whereas in Howell the potential for damage to the
mineral lessee’s ability to exploit its interest was sufficient to enjoin
Chevron’s plans for a horizontal wellbore, in Lightning Oil Anadarko was
permitted to drill its horizontal wellbores even though Lightning showed
it would lose some use of its mineral interest as a result.
These cases are reconcilable under a utility-balancing nuisance
analysis. Under nuisance, the destruction or drainage of minerals by an
intruding wellbore would be compensable if the gravity of the harm to the
nonconsenting owner (likely measurable by lost production) outweighs
the utility of drilling the wellbore to the defendant driller and the public.
Within this framework a slant-hole driller like Domengeaux would have
to show a compelling societal need to produce the well bottomed under
Union Oil’s lease to justify the serious loss of minerals Union Oil is likely
to suffer as a result. Alternatively, under nuisance’s compensation
principle, Union Oil’s loss of minerals may be so severe that no balancing
is necessary. It is clear from the court’s opinion in Domengeaux, however,
that there was no justification for Domengeaux’s actions that would
counterbalance Union Oil’s inevitable losses. Injunction was
therefore appropriate.
In Lightning Oil, on the other hand, the utility of Anadarko’s horizontal
drilling operation was high. It was necessary to produce minerals that
Anadarko was entitled to under its lease but otherwise could not access
because of the lease’s surface use restrictions. The harm to Lightning’s
ability to exploit its mineral interest was not significant in comparison
since it had no plans to develop the portion of the property where
Anadarko would drill and the amount of recoverable oil or gas that would
be lost by the wellbore would be quite small. By permitting Anadarko to
drill through the necessary portion of Lightning’s mineral estate the
Lightning Oil Court coordinated use of the subsurface of the Briscoe
Ranch to maximize efficiency of its use.

294. Id. at 526.
295. Id. at 528.
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Viewed as nuisance cases, Lightning Oil is also distinguishable from
Howell based on the relative harm-to-utility ratio presented in each case.
In Howell, Chevron’s superintendent admitted the directional wellbore
would damage the nonconsenting mineral owner’s reservoir. But unlike
Anadarko in Lightning Oil, Chevron apparently failed to raise any
argument to justify the damage. Chevron urged instead that its directional
wellbore would not interfere at all with the nonconsenting owner’s
mineral interest. Under a utilitarian nuisance analysis these cases are
distinguishable based on the strength of the evidence of the utility of
the interfering conduct.
E.

Hydraulic Fracturing Cases

Hydraulically fracturing (fracking) a well creates artificial fractures in
reservoir rock to increase permeability and stimulate its productive
capacity. Fracking involves pumping fluid and proppants into the
wellbore under immense pressure. The resulting fractures, called “frac
fissures,” can radiate hundreds of feet laterally from the wellbore, even
travelling beyond property lines to fracture rock and deposit fluid and
proppants in the subsurface of another.296 The high pressures created by
frac jobs can also flow through frac fissures and interfere with existing
wellbores on other property.297 This problem, called “frac hits,” most
commonly occurs where a newly drilled horizontal well is hydraulically
fractured in a field where vertical wells already produce.298 Some state
regulatory agencies have promulgated planning requirements for newly
fractured wells as a means of avoiding frac hits.299 For the most part,
296. Frac fissures are typically thousands of feet in length but their effective length is frequently
less than one hundred feet long. The “effective length” of a frac fissure is the portion that actually
drains hydrocarbons from the reservoir into the wellbore. The “propped length” of a frac fissure is the
portion that is held open by the proppants pumped in the fracturing treatment. The propped length is
usually much greater than the effective length. Greater still is the “hydraulic length” which is the
farthest extent of the fracturing fluids not including proppants. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2008).
297. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal & Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128, 16,181–
16,182 (Mar. 26, 2015) (defining this phenomenon as, the “unplanned interconnectivity of wells
during a hydraulic fracturing operation though the underground formations between the well
undergoing a fracturing operation and an existing well”).
298. See Pierce, supra note 43, at 264; see, e.g., Max Oil Co. v. Range Prod. Co., 681 F. App’x
710, 711–12 (10th Cir. 2017) (dismissing as untimely claims of negligence, trespass, nuisance, and
conversion brought by a vertical well operator against a horizontal well operator based on damage
alleged to have occurred to the plaintiff’s vertical well as a result of the defendant’s fracturing of its
horizontal well). Nonetheless, frac hits can occur wherever two wells are in close proximity and
opened to the same reservoir. Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 12-2.
299. E.g., COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, INTERIM STATEWIDE HORIZONTAL OFFSET
POLICY, at 1 (Feb. 10, 2014), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Policies/
InterimStatewideHorizontalOffsetPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QP2-6N4J].
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however, the risk of frac hits is dealt with by cooperative bargaining or
litigation among operators within a common reservoir.300
Fracturing operations are thus ripe for litigation in two relevant
categories of circumstances: when frac fissures, fluids, and proppants
cross property lines and drain minerals from another’s subsurface, and
when frac pressures communicate across property lines and interfere with
production from existing wells. As examined below, courts’ classification
of such invasions as trespassory or nontrespassory varies widely. Such
disputes may be resolved efficiently and equitably by a nuisance analysis.
1.

Fracking Resulting in Drainage

When frac fissures, fluids, and proppants extend past the boundaries of
the owner’s land and into adjoining land the issue arises whether any
hydrocarbons drained from the adjoining land become the property of the
fracking owner under the rule of capture. In considering this question
courts have applied a trespass analysis based on the ad coelum doctrine’s
definition of surface and subsurface ownership as modified by the rule of
capture. Under the rule of capture, any hydrocarbons drained from
adjoining land by a well located within the ad coelum-defined surface and
subsurface boundaries of the well owner’s land and produced in
compliance with conservation laws are the well owner’s legitimate
property.301 If, in contrast, a well is drilled and bottomed in the subsurface
of another’s land, “the driller has committed a trespass,” and any
hydrocarbons produced by the well’s owner are illegitimate and not
privileged under the rule of capture.302 Consequently hydraulic fracturing
precedent focuses on whether cross-boundary frac fissures and proppants
constitute a trespass. 303

300. See Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 12-10–12-11 (describing the informal and
voluntary process by which operators intending to complete fracking operations consult operators of
proximate vertical wells to resolve potential issues arising from frac hits).
301. See 1 KUNTZ, supra note 54, at 325–26 (“Such [capture] right must, however, be exercised by
operations within the vertical boundaries of the owner’s tract of land. If a well is drilled in such a
manner that it is bottomed under the land of another, the driller has committed a trespass.”); accord
Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938); Wronski
v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 571 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that “any violation of a proration
order constitutes conversion of oil from the pool, and subjects the violator to liability to all the owners
of interests in the pool for conversion of the illegally-obtained oil” (internal citations omitted)).
302. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 54, at 325–26.
303. Despite arising decades ago this question has only recently been directly litigated. A trio of
older Texas cases, which did not address the question squarely, appeared to presume that fracturing
under the property of another would constitute a trespass and thus that any drainage of hydrocarbons
from the fissures would not be protected by the rule of capture. See Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee
Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Holmes, 344 S.W.2d
421 (Tex. 1961); Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961).
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In 2008, the Texas Supreme Court held in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust304 that a subsurface invasion by frac fissures was not
an actionable trespass and permitted the fracking party to retain
hydrocarbons drained from the plaintiffs’ adjoining lands.305 Coastal
owned the oil and gas lease on Share 13 and also owned the fee mineral
interest in the adjoining Share 12. The Salinas parties were the lessors
under Coastal’s lease on Share 13 and thus owned the possibility of
reverter in the minerals. Coastal fracked a well on Share 12 to produce
natural gas from the Vicksburg T formation underlying both Share 12 and
Share 13. The parties agreed both the hydraulic and propped lengths of
the fractures traveled under Share 13; they did not agree whether the
effective length did.306 Upset the fractures might drain natural gas from
Share 13 and deprive them of royalties on the drained gas, the Salinas
parties sued for trespass. The court denied the Salinas parties relief finding
that Coastal had a right to drain hydrocarbons from the Salinas parties’
tract under the rule of capture.307
Because the Salinas parties had granted Coastal an oil and gas lease on
Share 13, under Texas law the Salinas parties owned only a future interest
in the mineral estate—a possibility of reverter. Since future interests are
nonpossessory the Salinas parties could not state a claim for trespass
quare clausum fregit and could proceed only under a claim for trespass
on the case. Unlike trespass quare clausum fregit trespass on the case
requires a showing of actual damages.308 The only damages claimed by
the Salinas parties consisted of drainage of natural gas from Share 13 to
Coastal’s well on Share 12. The Garza Court ultimately held that any
drainage damages would be precluded by the rule of capture. Since the
Salinas parties needed to show damages for their trespass cause of action,
they could not articulate an actionable trespass.
Writing for the dissent Justice Johnson criticized the majority for not
determining whether the extension of frac fissures into a nonconsenting
owner’s property constitutes a trespass in the first instance, noting that the
rule of capture would not apply to permit an operator to drain a neighbor’s
hydrocarbons by trespassory conduct.309 The dissent then analogized frac
fissures to deviated wellbores that are intentionally bottomed in another’s
land and reasoned that, like deviated wells, frac fissures would constitute
a trespass under Texas precedent.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 13–15.
Id. at 9–11.
Id. at 42–44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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The Garza majority cited four justifications for finding no “actionable
trespass.” Each justification turns on the public policy rationale that
hydraulic fracturing should be promoted because it prevents waste by
enabling production of tight reservoirs, like the Vicksburg T, that would
otherwise be unproductive.310 In concurrence Justice Willett wrote that he
would extend these policy justifications to hold that trespasses-by-frac are
no trespass at all based on the social value of increasing production of oil
and gas through hydraulic fracturing.311 Per Willett, “Balancing the
respective interests [of the industry and society as a whole and of the
plaintiffs’ particular interests,] . . . this type of subsurface
encroachment . . . simply isn’t wrongful and thus isn’t a trespass at all, not
just a nonactionable trespass.”312
The Garza majority’s balancing of public policy reasons for and
against establishing liability for the invasion is akin to nuisance law’s
balance of utilities test, not to the property rule of trespass. Despite
framing the issue as whether the encroachment of frac fissures is a
trespass, Garza approached the case much as a court would in determining
a nuisance case.313 Yet, because Garza assumed any invasion would be
trespassory, it lacked the articulable standards of nuisance for striking an
efficient and equitable balance between the parties’ conflicting interests
in use of the subsurface. Garza instead engaged in an ad hoc public
policy analysis.
Courts outside of Texas have not followed Garza. In Stone v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC314 the Northern District of West Virginia,
on facts similar to those in Garza, reaffirmed the ad coelum doctrine and
the traditional standard for trespass liability.315 The Stone Court held that
frac fissures travelling under a nonconsenting owner’s land constitute an
actionable trespass and therefore that drainage through cross-boundary
frac fissures is not privileged under the rule of capture.316 In so holding,
Stone rejected the Garza majority’s analysis, adopting instead Justice
Johnson’s reasoning, and added that Garza placed “the desires of the

310. Id. at 16–17.
311. Id. at 29.
312. Id. at 30.
313. See, e.g., Cyr v. Town of Brookfield, 216 A.2d 198, 200–01 (Conn. 1965) (reversing the trial
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim of nuisance against a municipality for its operation of a sewer
system on the basis that factfinding is necessary to determine whether under the balance of utilities
test the municipality’s invasion of the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the land outweighed the utility
of the municipality’s conduct (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW
INST. 1969)).
314. No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013).
315. Id.
316. Id. at *7–8.
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industry” over “the property rights of small landowners” who would be
drained by off-lease fracturing even if they did not consent to drilling or
production on their land.317
An intermediate-level appellate court in Pennsylvania also found that
cross-boundary frac fissures constitute a trespassory invasion of a
nonconsenting owner’s property in Briggs v. Southwestern Energy
Production Co.318 Like Stone, Briggs held that the rule of capture does not
preclude an action for drainage damages from unauthorized frac fissures.
Briggs’s analysis focused on the unique characteristics of the tight shale
gas reservoir at issue. Unlike in conventional oil and gas reservoirs, the
court explained, gas trapped in tight shales is nonmigratory in nature and
does not escape to adjoining land absent application of external, nonnatural forces like fracking. By this reasoning Briggs concluded the rule
of capture does not apply to capture of hydrocarbons through crossboundary frac fissures in the same way it applies to capture through
conventional means of production.319
The threshold question in trespass-by-frac cases is whether the entry of
a frac fissure into the subsurface of another violates a statute or regulation
or infringes the other’s property rights. If so, the rule of capture should
not apply and any drainage occasioned by the cross-boundary frac fissures
should not be privileged.320 Garza, Stone, and Briggs illustrate the
difficulty in making the threshold determination under a one-size-fits-all
rule that every cross-boundary frac fissure is or is not a trespass. Under
Garza a cross-boundary frac fissure may never be an actionable tort,
which may disadvantage small-tract owners in favor of broader public
interests even where it may not serve equity or public policy to do so. In
contrast jurisdictions following Briggs or Stone may reach socially
disadvantageous results by subordinating the importance of fracking and

317. Id. at *6–7.
318. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153, 163–64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (holding that
hydraulic fracturing does not alter the operation of the rule of capture, and that liability for drainage
caused by hydraulic fracturing, if at all, would be predicated on a showing that hydraulic fractures
physically invade the plaintiff’s subsurface), vacated and remanded by No. 63-MAP-2018, 2020 WL
355911 (Pa. Jan. 22, 2020).
319. Id. at 162–63. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted review on the following issue:
Does the rule of capture apply to oil and gas produced from wells that were completed using
hydraulic fracturing and preclude trespass liability for allegedly draining oil or gas from under
nearby property, where the well is drilled solely on and beneath the driller’s own property and
the hydraulic fracturing fluids are injected solely on or beneath the driller’s own property? Briggs
v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 197 A.3d 1168 (Table) (2018).
320. See People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 59–61 (Ind. 1892) (holding that the rule of capture
does not privilege conduct that would otherwise constitute a common law tort such as nuisance);
Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that drainage in violation
of conservation statutes is not privileged under the rule of capture and constitutes conversion).
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efficient hydrocarbon production in favor of the rights of small-tract
owners in every case.
Liability for frac invasions is better determined on a flexible, case-bycase basis under nuisance. The outcomes in frac invasion cases will vary
under a utilitarian nuisance standard depending on the relative utility of
the frac operations at issue and the gravity of the harm to, and utility of,
the plaintiff’s subsurface activities—all in the context of the character of
the local reservoir.321 Courts already consider the relative importance of
the parties’ competing subsurface activities to determine liability in
fracking cases. However, the holdings in Garza, Briggs, and Stone fail to
acknowledge that a balancing test is inappropriate for determining breach
of a party’s right of possession. Interest- or utility-balancing is only
appropriate, if ever, instead for resolving clashes of discordant use
of common property.
The hydraulic fracturing cases are doctrinally inconsistent because they
misidentify the primary property right at stake, which is the right of use
and not possession. Because the courts have couched the question in terms
of whether a frac invasion is a trespass (as opposed to nuisance) their
holdings do not easily accommodate differing results in cases involving
unique facts. On the contrary if a cross-boundary frac fissure breaches the
affected owner’s possessory interest in one case, it should be a breach in
every case. Many of the factual variables that make frac invasion cases
difficult are easier to reconcile under a nuisance framework. Treating frac
invasions as nuisances would permit courts greater flexibility to consider
factors like reservoir characteristics and the commonness of hydraulic
fracturing within the reservoir in determining the appropriateness of the
operations to the character of the area.
Nuisance principles also provide a framework for evaluating the
potential harmfulness of a frac invasion to a plaintiff’s interest. For
instance, if the effective length of a frac fissure crosses into a
nonconsenting owner’s land, it would be likelier to cause severe harm
through drainage than if only the propped length (which does not cause
drainage) crosses the property line. Under a true trespass analysis both
fissures would be equally invasive and actionable. Under a nuisance
analysis, in contrast, the gravity of the invasion would depend on the
likelihood of the fracture to cause drainage. Whether any resulting
drainage is privileged under the rule of capture would depend on whether
321. When the generic type of dispute in these cases is properly framed as being between competing
uses of property, the fact that courts in different places at different times resolve similar cases
differently becomes reconcilable doctrinally. See Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One’s Own
Property as a Justification for Damage to a Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 383, 402 & nn.88–90
(1917) (noting in his discussion of the then-present state of nuisance law that “[t]he question of
superiority between two modes of user may be, and has been, decided differently in the same state
at different dates”).
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the severity of the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the utility of the
defendant’s actions. If so the rule of capture would not apply, and the
drainage would be compensable.
By properly identifying the property right at stake—the right of use and
enjoyment—and applying the appropriate remedial legal regime—
nuisance—it is possible to achieve doctrinal consistency across and within
jurisdictions. Even if the results in these cases would not change if
analyzed as a nuisance, properly framing the nature of the invasion and
applying the corresponding tort regime would harmonize the disparate
results and lend coherence to the area of law.
2.

Frac Hits

There does not yet appear to be an appellate case addressing the merits
of a frac-hit dispute.322 Mark Christiansen and Professor David Pierce
have sketched the paradigm frac-hit dispute as follows:
[A]ssume a reservoir owner desires to drill a horizontal well in a
reservoir containing an existing vertical well. The horizontal well
developer is concerned about avoiding or minimizing any
interwellbore communication with an offsetting vertical well.
Assume the remedy is to shut in the vertical well while the
horizontal well is undergoing hydraulic fracturing. Suppose the
vertical well owner (1) refuses to shut in, (2) demands
compensation for lost revenue during the shut-in period, or
(3) asserts damage to the well or the reservoir. How will these
issues be resolved?323
Frac hits pose basic resource allocation questions: where two operators
desire to produce oil or gas from a common reservoir by conflicting
means, one by a preexisting vertical well and the other by a newly fracked
horizontal well, which means of production should prevail? Which
operator’s property rights entitle it to produce by its preferred means?324
Trespass would be a poor analytical tool for resolving these issues
because, as illustrated by Garza, Briggs, and Stone, it imposes a strict,
absolute-liability-or-nothing standard despite the unique circumstances of
a given case. Moreover, a trespass analysis would focus on the physical
or nonphysical nature of the intrusion, which sheds little light in a
competition between nonpossessory use rights. Nor would a trespass

322. See Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 12–11 (“A number of low-profile lawsuits have
been filed by vertical well operators against operators of new horizontal wells alleging that the
plaintiff’s vertical well was damaged as a result of a frac job. Currently, the authors are not aware of
any frac hit lawsuits that have resulted in any substantive law rulings.”).
323. Pierce, supra note 43, at 265.
324. See id. at 265 (proposing a reservoir community analysis for resolving the legal question).
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analysis leave room for consideration of any characteristics of the
geologic reservoir. A court applying trespass would first determine
whether the invasion was sufficiently physically intrusive to constitute a
trespass. Unlike in most drainage-by-frac cases where fractures and
proppants enter the plaintiff’s property, the intruding agent in most frac
hits cases is likely to be pressure. Courts following the dimensional test
might not find this to be a physical intrusion, whereas courts that have
adopted the reasoning of Martin v. Reynolds probably would.325 Trespass
analysis may render opposite results in these two types of jurisdictions
even where the underlying reservoir-use conflict is the same in both.
Even a modified trespass rule that privileges socially valuable physical
intrusions may not render consistent outcomes, because frac hits cases
involve two competing methods of exploiting the minerals in a
reservoir—vertical and horizontal production—whose relative values will
vary depending on reservoir characteristics and market conditions. This
differs from the typical trespass-by-frac case, which presents a single
method of mineral development set against the complaining owner’s
nonuse of the minerals. Consider Garza, where the societal value of
fracking unconventional reservoirs justified infringement of the
nonconsenting reservoir owners’ property rights. In Garza the
nonconsenting owners did not assert that their nonuse of the reservoir was
better suited to developing the reservoir. In a typical frac-hit case, in
contrast, both parties would be putting the reservoir to productive uses
and would likely offer countervailing reasons their respective production
techniques should prevail. Courts in these cases will be asked to evaluate
the competing production techniques and the characteristics of the
reservoir to determine the development scheme most likely to maximize
efficient exploitation of the common reservoir.
Nuisance is the appropriate standard for making these kinds of
evaluations. In considering the paradigm frac hits case a court applying
utilitarian nuisance framework would start by determining the nature of
the first-in-time vertical well operator’s injury. The harm suffered by the
vertical well operator from the horizontal well operator’s frac job may be
physical damage to the vertical well, diminished production from the
vertical well, or having to completely shut in the vertical well. The harm
in each case is interference with the vertical operator’s ability to produce
its portion of the common reservoir through its vertical well. This is a loss
of the reservoir’s use value to the operator. It does not matter whether the
loss of use was caused by a physical intrusion, as by proppants, or merely
by pressure changes from the horizontal frac job.

325. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959).
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The second step would be to determine whether the horizontal
operator’s frac job was justified despite the vertical operator’s lost use
value. An invasion is justified in nuisance doctrine when the utility of the
conduct outweighs the gravity of the resulting harm.326 To determine
whether the utility of the interfering conduct outweighs the gravity of the
vertical operator’s loss of reservoir use under this analysis, the court
would consider the extent of the vertical operator’s inability to produce
the reservoir. A relatively minor decline in production would weigh in
favor of finding the horizontal frac job to be reasonable. But a loss of all
production from a well or the loss of all ability to produce the reservoir
from a new well would weigh heavily in favor of compensating the
vertical operator’s loss.
Applying the Second Restatement, the court would further consider the
parties’ ability to avoid the harm. It would inquire about such facts as
whether the horizontal operator could have designed its frac job
differently without giving up efficiency, whether the vertical operator
could have reinforced the casing of its vertical well by improving how it
was cemented in the hole, and whether the vertical operator could have
pooled its interest with the horizontal operator’s before the horizontal well
was drilled and completed. The court would also focus on the suitability
of vertical and horizontal production techniques to the reservoir. If the
reservoir is unconventional (like the Vicksburg T formation in Garza or
the tight sand in Stone) horizontal drilling and massive frac operations
would be necessary to produce the reservoir efficiently. If, on the other
hand, the reservoir is conventional (e.g., a limestone formation) and
production in the field is mature and mostly from vertical wells, the
horizontal frac job would be out of place and less justifiable, especially if
no horizontal wells have been drilled and proven economic in the field.
The court would also balance the public’s interest in how the reservoir
is managed by weighing the social utility of vertical and horizontal
production. The public’s interest is in the avoidance of waste of
hydrocarbons, waste of reservoir pressure, and waste from drilling,
equipping, and producing needless numbers of wells to produce the
reservoir.327 The horizontal operator could justify its operations by
showing that horizontal fracking is necessary to recover hydrocarbons
from the reservoir that would otherwise be left behind by vertical
production. The vertical operator could improve its case for compensation
by showing that existing vertical production of the reservoir is sufficient
326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1969).
327. See Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 11–12 (describing the public’s interest in
maximizing production and citing the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission’s 2004 Model Oil
& Gas Conservation Act).
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to maximize recovery of the hydrocarbons and thus that horizontal drilling
and completions are needlessly expensive and wasteful.
If after evaluating these factors the court were to find that horizontal
fracturing was justified, the vertical operator would have to suffer any lost
production opportunity without compensation unless it could show that
the loss is serious or severe.328 The vertical operator’s loss may be serious
or severe if, for instance, the horizontal completion would render
impossible or noneconomic production of the reservoir from a vertical
well anywhere on the vertical operator’s lease. If the loss were shown to
be serious, the vertical operator may be entitled to compensation, provided
that the cost of compensation in this and similar cases would not render
horizontal completions in the reservoir uneconomic. This may be a
complex question, but it is necessary to avoid an outcome in which the
most efficient means of production is barred as a practical matter even if
it is otherwise permitted. 329 If the harm were shown to be severe and such
that the vertical operator should not have to suffer without compensation,
the horizontal operator would be absolutely liable under the
compensation principle.330
F.

Disputes Arising from CCS and Other Emerging Technologies

There does not appear to be any reported case involving a subsurface
invasion from CCS or other emerging techniques like ASR and CAES.331
As previously discussed, however, the potential for such disputes has
helped stymie deployment of CCS technology.332 The prevailing
understanding of subsurface property as possessory and subsurface
encroachments as trespassory threatens to undermine this and other
potentially beneficial technology in two broad ways. First, it would
require a CO2 injector to obtain consent from the pore space owners of
hundreds or thousands of square miles of property to avoid trespass
liability from migrating CO2.333 In this scenario the likelihood of holdouts,
which could prevent the CCS project, is high. Second, the principle of
absolute liability that flows from the possessory view would practically
require a CO2 injector to insure against all damage caused by the
injection.334 Because CO2 injection is likely to interfere with preexisting
328. As those terms are defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826 & 829A, respectively.
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1969).
330. Id. § 829A.
331. For a description of ASR, CAES, and CCS technology, see supra Part I.B.
332. See supra section I.C.
333. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
334. While the modern approach to subsurface trespass articulated by Professor Anderson may
avoid the problem of obtaining unanimous consent, it nonetheless would impose absolute liability on
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commercial subsurface activities,335 the financial burden of compensating
for resulting harm may well make CCS operations infeasible. The
possessory view would similarly undermine any large-scale use of
subsurface reservoir space for fluid storage, such as ASR or CAES.
The dual problems of aggregating consent and compensating resulting
harm without undermining the economic feasibility of CCS would be
more soluble if the legal system (and all the individual judges, scholars,
and lawyers who comprise it) understood subsurface property as
nonpossessory and invasions as nontrespassory. Under a nonpossessory
view, aggregating the consent of all owners of potentially affected pore
space would be unnecessary. A reservoir owner would not be entitled to
exclude injected CO2 merely by virtue of owning an interest in the
reservoir. Instead, an objecting owner could enjoin the injection operation
only by showing actual damage to the owner’s right of use and enjoyment
and that the harm is not justified by injection’s utility.336 The injector in
such a case may avoid injunction by paying compensation for any harm
suffered by the objecting owner and thus increasing the injection
operation’s utility.337 Nuisance doctrine thus replaces the need for consent
with the option to pay reasonable compensation, thereby compelling the
participation of holdout landowners.
Nuisance doctrine also furnishes a compensation scheme superior to
strict liability. Whereas strict liability for damages resulting from publicly
beneficial injection operations may render the operations economically
infeasible, nuisance law contains provisions designed to avoid this result
in all but the most extreme cases. Only when a landowner’s ability to use
her property is severely damaged and the damage is greater than the
landowner “should have to bear without compensation” should a court
applying nuisance law award compensation without considering the CCS
operation’s social value or viability.338
In cases not involving such severe harm, a landowner’s right to full
compensation for injury resulting from a socially beneficial CCS
operation may be subordinated to the operator’s right to continue the
operation. Harm from CCS operations that is “serious” but not quite
the injector for actual damages from the injection. See Anderson, supra note 31, section III.B.1. Thus,
even if modified under Professor Anderson’s approach, the possessory view may impede deployment
of socially valuable technologies.
335. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
336. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW. INST. 1969).
337. See id. cmt. e (“In a suit for damages, the legal utility of the activity may also be greatly
reduced by the fact that the actor is operating the factory and producing the noise and smoke without
compensating his neighbors for the harm done to them. The conduct for which the utility is being
weighed includes both the general activity and what is done about its consequences.”).
338. See id. § 829A; see also Lewin, supra note 111, at 231.
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“severe” would warrant compensation without regard to the operation’s
utility, but only if the financial burden of compensating this and similar
losses would not cause the CCS operation to cease.339 In the absence of
severe or serious harm an affected landowner would be entitled to
damages only if, after considering evidence of the character of the locality,
the character of the harm, and the social value of the parties’ conflicting
land uses,340 the court finds the gravity of the landowner’s loss outweighs
the utility of the CCS operation.341
Viewing subsurface property invasions as nuisances would mean
resolving them under the same legal framework as nontrespassory
invasions caused by above-ground waste storage activities. CCS projects
would be treated much like landfills. When a landfill emits unreasonably
foul smells into the surrounding neighborhood, for example, the law
classifies harm done to neighbors’ property a nuisance. The odor particles
emanating from the landfill may diminish neighbors’ ability to use or
enjoy their property. It might prevent them from using the land in certain
ways—perhaps operating a botanical garden—and reduce the value of
their property for rent or sale. But the stench does not dispossess the
neighbors of their property or of the airspace above it. When a neighbor
sues the landfill to abate the odor or recover damages to compensate for
lost use or enjoyment, the typical court balances the social value of the
landfill against the gravity of harm from the externality. In so doing the
court will attempt to efficiently coordinate the parties’ competing uses of
the semi-common airspace overlying their respective parcels of land.
CONCLUSION
If it walks like a nuisance and talks like a nuisance, it might be a
nuisance. Courts de facto apply nuisance principles in subsurface
interference cases because nuisance standards are designed to mediate
competing uses of property to achieve maximally efficient results. In
contrast, trespass seems inapplicable in situations involving unauthorized
subsurface encroachments because they do not interfere with exclusivity
and are not susceptible to a strict scheme of governance. Trespass is not

339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1969); see also Lewin, supra
note 111, at 231. The drafters of the Restatement explain that “[t]he extent of the burden of
compensating may also affect the determination of what persons can recover. Thus in the case of a
factory emitting smoke and odors, the granting of compensation for annoyance and inconvenience to
all persons located in the general vicinity may create a burden so heavy as to make it not feasible to
continue to operate the factory. Compensation may therefore be granted only to those in close vicinity
to the plant whose annoyance is more severe, and not to those farther away whose annoyance is less.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. f.
340. Id. § 827.
341. See id. § 826(a).
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the applicable tort regime to enforce incorporeal property interests, and
thus contains standards inappropriate to that task.
Evidence that courts treat subsurface interferences as nontrespassory
appears in the facts courts consider in determining liability. These
typically include the social and economic value of the defendant’s
conduct, the commonness of the conduct in the area, and the severity of
the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Where, as in most cases, the value of
the defendant’s activity is high, such as where it contributes to the
prevention waste, and the plaintiff is unable to show actual damages other
than the value of pore space invaded and occupied, courts tend to find no
trespass. Yet these factors are not appropriate in determining injury to an
owner’s possession. They are appropriate, rather, in determining injury to
the owner’s reasonable use and enjoyment.
The true nature of the property interest at stake in subsurface
interference cases is use and enjoyment. It is both logical and doctrinally
appropriate to apply nuisance, because nuisance is the tort regime
designed to remedy violations of the use right. Because trespass is the
wrong standard for remedying infringement of the right to use property,
applying trespass requires modifying the doctrine in meaningful ways.
Nuisance principles were developed by courts to mediate conflicting uses
of adjoining land and, consequently, provide better guidance for courts in
resolving cases where subsurface activities collide. Nuisance also enables
a more flexible tailoring of remedies where an unjustified interference is
found.
Courts are already engaging in nuisance-like analyses; doing it
expressly would aid the coherence of their decisions. Improving the
coherence and predictability of courts’ decision-making in these cases is
not trivial. Development of commercial-scale CCS facilities, for example,
requires the right to use hundreds or thousands of square miles of
subsurface reservoir rights. The risk that offsetting subsurface owners
may object to use of their pore space for CO2 storage has slowed, and
currently threatens to paralyze, large-scale deployment of sequestration
technology. The possibility that courts may apply a strict liability standard
for any damages that may arise—whether or not such damage should be
considered legal injury—may inhibit deployment of CCS and other useful
subterranean technologies.

